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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s, a group of new political parties gained support and influence 
throughout Europe. Some of these parties came from a long political tradition in their 
countries, while others were formed in more recent times of apparent political 
upheaval (Arter 1999; Betz 1994; Hainsworth 2000). This trend caused the political 
establishment to react with skepticism. Some thought the parties were a continuation 
of the Radical Right and Fascism of the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, they feared the 
destructive potential of the new parties, which I will call Radical Right Parties (RRPs). 
However, the RRPs of the 1990s do not associate themselves with the fascist 
movement, and their policies are also different in most respects (Ignazi and Ysmal 
1992). Still, they are the first successful movement of the Radical Right since the 
Second World War. 
 Most of the new Radical Right Parties experienced a revival in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Their success at the polls coincided with an increased movement of 
immigrants in Europe, and with the end of the Cold War. Some of the parties also 
changed their leadership-structure in this period (Betz 1994, pp. 12-13; Bjørklund 
1988, p214; Goul Andersen 1992, p193; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2000, pp. 194-
196; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2001; Morrow 2000, p33). In the 1990s, both the 
Northern League in Italy, and the Freedom Party in Austria received so many votes 
they managed to become parts of governing coalitions in their respective countries. 
These events contributed to an increasing concern with European Radical Right Parties 
in the media, and among politicians and pundits. The mere support and influence of 
these parties ensured their presence in national political debates. Furthermore, as the 
parties grew, so did the international debate about the Radical Right, especially so 
within the European Union. 
This ongoing debate is based on some established “truths” or premises about 
Radical Right Parties and their supporters. These ideas are partly derived from 
political science research, partly from analogies to the Radical Right of the 1930s, and 
also from popular perceptions and clichés. The political establishment’s negative 
attitude toward the Radical Right may have led to some overly derogatory descriptions 
of these parties and their voters. One such stereotype is the concept of the “protest 
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party” or “protest vote”, which is often associated with Radical Right Parties. These 
and similar terms imply a distinctly negative message. They enable political 
commentators to dismiss the substantive policies and opinions of these parties and 
their supporters, and rather focus on more diffuse and negative characteristics. I 
believe there are reasons to question this established perception, not least because it is 
such a “convenient” argument for opponents of the Radical Right. Therefore, I will 
take a critical look at these descriptions, and thus, I hope my dissertation will be more 
nuanced and accurate. 
 
Outline 
The object of this introductory chapter is to present the topic of my dissertation as well 
as its more specific research questions and hypotheses. I will also outline a general 
theoretical and methodological approach, even though chapters two and three deal 
with such issues in greater detail.  
Specifically, I will start by describing my dissertation’s relationship with a 
European project on “Extreme Right Parties”. I then proceed identify and elaborate on 
my specific research questions and hypotheses. In the final part of this chapter, I will 
perform a thorough discussion of my “comparative” methodology. It seems to me that 
studies of this sort too often choose a random group of countries for analysis. I will try 
to justify my choices through an empirical discussion of a number of “contextual 
variables”.  
 
The Extreme Right Party Project 
My dissertation will be a part of a comparative research project on "Extreme Right 
Parties" in Europe. My tutor, Tor Bjørklund, serves as the Norwegian contributor, and 
thus, as my link to the project. The participants of this international project have 
preliminarily decided to use the term “Extreme Right Parties”, as a label for what I 
have so far called “Radical Right Parties”. Other researchers use terms like “New 
Radical Right Parties” (Kitschelt 1997), “Right Wing Populist Parties” (Betz 1998), or 
even “Discontent Parties” (Lane and Ersson 1991, p108). Intuitively I find “Extreme 
Right Parties” to be too closely related to the Extreme Right of Nazi Germany or 
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Fascist Italy. Consequently, I will continue to use the term “Radical Right”, which I 
find more neutral, and not quite as negatively charged as “Extreme Right”. 
 This pragmatic choice of label stems from my belief that the content is more 
important than the actual name. I am not arguing that “Radical Right Parties” is 
necessarily the most appropriate name. By using a relatively neutral name I hope to 
avoid the dispute about terminology. Thus, I will be able to focus on what is more 
important: the substantial characteristics that identify this group of political parties. I 
will discuss these characteristics in some detail in chapter two. 
 
Supply and Demand 
The Extreme Right Party Project will apply several perspectives to the study of these 
parties, and they plan to deal with most relevant aspects1. I will apply a more limited 
perspective in my dissertation. A good starting point for narrowing down my focus of 
attention is the well-known distinction between supply and demand (see e.g. Kitschelt 
1997). These economic terms can be used to look at political parties as players in a 
political market. The political party systems, and the parties themselves, represent a 
supply of alternatives for voters on Election Day. Citizens, on the other hand, have 
political demands that they want politicians and their parties to fulfill. Both the 
demand-side and supply-side need to be met for a new political party to emerge and 
survive (Kitschelt 1997, pp2-3). 
A study of political parties can focus on either supply or demand, or both. My 
attention will be on the demand, i.e. on voters. As the subtitle of my dissertation 
indicates, I will analyze the motivations of Radical Right Party voters, given the 
supply of such parties. I believe supply and demand are intertwined entities. Therefore, 
this approach should also enable me to make observations about the parties 
themselves. Although this is a generally accepted position2, there are those who 
disagree. Panabianco (1988) calls this type of inference a “sociological prejudice”, 
which he argues, “consists in the belief that the activities of parties are the product of 
the ‘demands’ of social groups, and that, more generally, parties themselves are 
                                              
1 Report on the ECPR Research Session – Barcelona; http://cidsp.upmf-grenoble.fr/guest/ereps/index.htm 
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nothing other than manifestations of social divisions in the political arena” (p4). 
Consequently, he rejects this mode of analysis (pp. 4-5). 
 Panabianco is right in his methodological critique, but I believe he goes too far. 
Most observers will argue that voters support political parties for a reason. Their 
choices are presumably based on an, at least partially, accurate perception of the 
parties. These “commonsense” observations indicate that there is a link between voters 
and parties, i.e. between supply and demand. Thus, I believe my conclusions at the 
voter-level of analysis will also be a reflection of the Radical Right Parties themselves.  
 With these clarifications in mind, I will look at the substantive issues that I 
intend to deal with in the dissertation. My starting point is the term “protest party”, and 
that term’s possible applicability to Radical Right Parties. 
  
Protest Parties? 
Hans Jørgen Nielsen (1976) chose the following title for his study of the Danish 
Progress Party’s electorate in the 1970s: “The Uncivic Culture: Attitudes towards the 
Political System in Denmark, and Vote for the Progress Party 1973-1975”. In the 
conclusion, he explains his reference to Almond and Verba’s “The Civic Culture” 
(1963; 1989): 
 
What stands out above all is that former pictures of Danish politics have to be 
profoundly revised. In view of the Progress Party’s strength, the left-right 
dimension is not sufficient. Furthermore, the incorporation of Denmark among 
those nations with harmonious civic cultures seems dubious. There has been a 
marked instability in the party system, combined with a high amount of distrust and 
authoritarianism, and these attitudes are related to the party most clearly associated 
with the upheavals in Danish politics [the Progress Party] (p154). 
 
Nielsen’s attitudes are not unique. Political commentators and analysts often assert that 
Radical Right Parties threaten the political cultures and systems in which they operate. 
By referring to “the Civic Culture”, Nielsen illustrates the normative basis for these 
arguments. According to Almond and Verba, stable democratic systems are dependent 
on a specific type of political culture. One essential feature of this “culture” concerns 
the relationship between political trust and influence. As long as individuals feel that 
                                                                                                                                             
2 Here are some classical works on politics that make the inference from voters to parties: Campbell (1960); 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967); Valen and Katz (1967). 
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they are able to influence political decisions in a democracy, they will be satisfied 
with, and trusting of the political system. These attitudes will strengthen people’s 
belief in democracy, and will have a stabilizing effect on the political system. These 
assertions lead to some normative conclusions about the role of citizens. First of all, 
people living in stable democratic countries should trust their political system, and 
consider its decisions legitimate. Furthermore, they ought to express that trust even if 
they disagree with government policies (Almond and Verba 1989, pp. 191 and 203-
204). 
 Analysts and researchers of Radical Right Parties often find that these parties’ 
electorates do not confirm to this norm. On the contrary, they usually observe RRP 
supporters as distrusting and suspicious of politicians and the political system. Some 
analysts make moral condemnations, along the lines of Nielsen, presumably also on 
the basis of the “civic culture” norm (Knight 1992; Narum 2001; Nielsen 1979). In 
terms of empirical results, these researches assert that political distrust leads to Radical 
Right Party support. Distrusting voters cast their ballot in favor of RRPs as an 
expression of political protest. That does not preclude other protest activities, such as 
voter abstention, demonstrations, petitions etc, but in terms of actual voting, these 
parties do appear as the choice of the discontented. Consequently, there is a positive 
bivariate relationship between political distrust, and RRP support, as illustrated in 
figure 1.1. This argument is supported by research into each of the political parties I 
intend to study and not least by political commentators and columnists who deal with 
these parties (Arter 1999, pp.103-107; Betz 1994, pp. 45-46; Morrow 2000; and 
Riedlsperger 1998). 
 
Figure 1.1 A bivariate model of political protest 
 
      Protest voting 
    + 
 
Political distrust RRP-support
 
“Political Protest” 
Figure 1.1 incorporates the term “protest”, which I have yet to define. Van Der Brug, 
Fennema and Tillie (2000) define a “protest voter” as “a rational voter whose objective 
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is to demonstrate rejection of all other parties” (p82). I believe they confuse the 
objective of the protest with the actual protest. I see protest as an act, not an objective, 
and it should not be confused with the motivation for this act. Political protest stems 
from some kind of unhappiness, or dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. My model 
defines that sentiment as “political distrust”. That is the driving motivation for political 
protest. I have not yet dealt with a protester’s possible objectives. But unless people 
act in order to achieve an objective, I do not consider them protesters. So, I do not 
agree with Van Der Burg et al (2000) who define “protest” by a person’s objectives. 
I will define “protest” as the act of expressing political distrust or disapproval. 
Protest serves as the causal link between the two variables “political trust” and “RRP-
support” in my model. However, since protest sometimes takes other forms, such as 
voter abstention, demonstrations, acts of violence etc, I need a more specific approach 
for my purpose. Therefore, I will define “protest voting” as an expression of political 
distrust by voting for a Radical Right Party. 
 
Main Research Question 
Despite the large amount of previous research, I will try to take a new look at the 
causal relationship between political distrust, and RRP-voting. My main research 
question is this: What is the relationship between political distrust and support for 
Radical Right Parties? Figure 1.1 illustrates my initial hypothesis. It suggests a 
positive relationship between the variables, which is caused by RRP-voters expression 
of protest at the polls. 
 The academic literature on this issue consistently argues in favor of the 
hypothesis I have illustrated in figure 1.1. Despite this prevailing view and the 
supporting evidence, I still find the “protest hypothesis” to be both unclear and overly 
normative. Specifically, the concept of “political trust” is hard to define. I will try to 
offer a different approach to this and other related terms, than what has become the 
norm in political science. Thus, I hope to perform a more accurate and less 
normatively charged analysis, than some analysts have done thus far. In order to do 
that, I first need to look at relevant theoretical and methodological issues, which I will 
do in chapters two and three, respectively. 
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 Another reason for my skepticism about the “protest-hypothesis” is the sheer 
endurance and longevity of these parties. The concept of "protest" seems to refer to a 
short-lived or fluctuating phenomenon, maybe in relation to a specific hot topic of the 
day. Most European Radical Right Parties cannot be interpreted as "protest parties" in 
this sense, since they have gained high levels of support for several decades. Given 
these objections, I believe a thorough analysis of this issue is warranted. 
 
Further Hypotheses 
In addition to the main research question, I will analyze and test three subordinate 
hypotheses. They are closely related to my main research question, and should be seen 
as expansions on, rather than alternatives to the established hypothesis. The three 
hypotheses are different interpretations of “political distrust” in the context of Radical 
Right Party voting. I believe they represent three possible levels of protest that vary 
according to the gravity of the protesters’ grievances.  
 My first hypothesis stems from one of Ignazi’s articles on Radical Right 
Parties. He argues that RRPs have an “anti-system profile”, and thus, fall within 
Sartori’s category of “anti-system parties” (Ignazi 1992, pp. 11-13). Sartori defines a 
party as “anti-system”, "whenever it undermines the legitimacy of the regime it 
opposes" (Sartori 1976, p133). Furthermore, people who support these parties are both 
alienated from, and in opposition to the current political system (ibid. pp. 132-134). It 
is worth noting that both Sartori and Ignazi presuppose that political parties are 
elements of a democratic “political system” (Ignazi 1992, p12; Sartori 1976, pp. 56-
57). Hence, they argue that RRP voters hold negative attitudes toward their country’s 
democratic institutions, its political parties, and the democratic principles that the 
system is based upon. 
Despite Ignazi’s focus on supply, I will analyze the demand-side of his 
argument. That leads me to the following hypothesis: Radical Right Party voters are 
distrusting of, and in opposition to the political systems of their countries. They 
express political distrust by voting for an RRP. I consider this the gravest and most 
threatening form of protest, since it is directed at the political system and its 
democratic foundations. 
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 Heidar (1989) argues that the Norwegian Progress Party express “anti-
consensus”-attitudes (p147), while Arter (1999) uses “anti-establishment” as a 
descriptive term for all the Scandinavian RRPs (p123). Despite the semantic 
difference3, I believe they are making similar arguments. “Anti-establishment”- or 
“anti-consensus”-attitudes relate to incumbent political authorities only. If those terms 
apply to RRP voters, it makes them less extreme than someone holding “anti-system” 
attitudes, and more in line with voters of other parties. This is the basis for my second 
hypothesis: RRP voters are motivated by their distrust of the political establishment. If 
that is the case, they are not as threatening to the political systems as Ignazi’s 
argument might suggest. 
My third hypothesis makes RRP-supporters look even less “radical”. It suggests 
that political distrust is a function of issues and government incumbencies. That is, 
voters of Radical Right Parties are distrusting simply because they disagree with the 
policies of the incumbent government. Thus, they merely distrust certain policies, as 
opposed to political elites, or the political system. Listhaug’s findings on “Political 
Disaffection” in Norway (2000) suggest that possibility. Hence, I hypothesize: 
substantive issues and belief systems are the primary motivations of RRP-supporters. 
Their beliefs are not part of established political thinking, which is why Radical Right 
Party voters do not trust the political establishment. However, substantive policies are 
the real reasons for their choices on Election Day. 
 I have tried to illustrate the three subordinate hypotheses in figure 1.2. It 
incorporates four variables, in a more complex multivariate model of political protest. 
The figure distinguishes between political distrust directed at the political system on 
the one hand, and the political establishment on the other. This is in accordance with 
my first and second hypothesis. I have incorporated the third hypothesis, by use of a 
variable called “issues and belief systems”. This model will be the basis of my 
empirical analysis in chapter four. I will deal with each variable in more detail in the 
second and third chapters. 
 
                                              
3 One may interpret these differences as more than just semantics, but in terms of my three levels of political 
protest, I believe they should be counted in the same category. 
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Figure 1.2 A multivariate model of political protest 
 
 
 
 
       System-protest (1) 
 
 
       Elite Protest (2) 
 
 
       (3) 
 
 
 
 
Issues / 
belief 
systems 
System 
distrust
Elite 
distrust 
RRP-
support 
Before I proceed to a theoretical and methodological discussion of this model, I need 
to select some countries where I can perform this type of analysis. They obviously 
need to be countries with Radical Right Parties, but they should also be similar in other 
respects that are relevant to my research. If the parties that I select exist in similar 
contexts, I should be able to find common effects in my model, which are not just 
country specific. That is the goal of my analysis. 
 
Austria and Scandinavia 
Several Western-European countries have seen successful Radical Right Parties in the 
1990s, so there are a lot of possible cases for me to look at. The French National 
Front, the Belgian Vlams Block, and the Italian Northern League, are some well-
known examples. However, for this analysis, I have selected four different countries 
and their five RRPs. They are the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Norwegian 
Progress Party, the Danish Progress Party and Danish People’s Party4 and the 
Swedish New Democracy. With the exception of the Danish People’s Party, which 
was formed in 1995, all of these parties had some kind of breakthrough or revival in 
the late 1980s or early 1990s, as shown in table 1.1. Some of these parties went 
through a period of transformation in connection with this revival. Their focus shifted 
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toward immigration policies, at the expense of issues like taxation and welfare 
spending that were in focus in the 1970s (Betz 1994, pp. 12-13; Bjørklund 1988, p214; 
Goul Andersen 1992, p193; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2000, pp. 194-196; Goul 
Andersen and Bjørklund 2001; and Morrow 2000, p33;). These changes were 
particularly dramatic in the Austrian FPÖ. Morrow (2000) argues that the reforms led 
to the formation of a “New FPÖ”, which was radically different from the old party. To 
avoid problems of comparability over time, and to increase comparability between 
countries, I will focus on the period after this revival. 
 
Table 1.1 Election results for Radical Right Parties in the parliamentary 
elections of Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden since 1973. Percent of 
valid votes. 
 AUSTRIA NORWAY DENMARK SWEDEN 
 Freedom Party 
(FPÖ) 
Progress Party 
(Frp) 
Progress Party Danish People’s 
Party 
New 
Democracy 
1973  5.0 15.9   
1975 5.4  13.6   
1977  1.9 14.6   
1979 6.1  11.0   
1981  4.5 8.9   
1983 5.0     
1984   3.6   
1985  3.7    
1986 9.7     
1987   4.8   
1988   9.0   
1989  13.0    
1990 16.6  6.4   
1991     6.7 
1993  6.3    
1994 22.5  6.4  1.2 
1995 21.9     
1997  15.3    
1998   2.4 7.4  
1999 26.9     
2001  14.6 0.6 12.0  
 
 
Similar Contexts 
I have now limited my analysis by selecting four countries and their respective RRPs, 
and by focusing on a limited time frame. These choices were to a large extent 
                                                                                                                                             
4 The Danish People’s Party is now the de facto successor of the Progress Party (Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 
2000).  
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influenced by my personal interests and knowledge. But more importantly, I believe 
they constitute a good methodological strategy. I will argue that my selected cases are 
similar in most aspects that are relevant to my research, and that makes them ideal for 
the type of statistical analysis I intend to perform. 
 Most political scientists who conduct this type of research into political parties 
in more than one country are fairly vague about their reasons for choosing some 
countries, and not others. Some seem to just presume that their selected countries are 
fit for comparison, especially so if they choose countries that are generally considered 
to be similar. Others are entirely oblivious to these problems, and appear to conduct a 
more or less coincidental selection of countries. Betz and Immerfall’s “The New 
Politics of the Right” (1998) is a case in point. They include Western Europe, Greece, 
North America, and India in their analysis of Radical Right Parties, but do not discuss 
the “comparability” of these cases. In this section, I do intend to discuss the extent to 
which my selected cases are fit for comparison. I believe that will increase the validity 
of any conclusions that I reach, and it will give the reader the necessary perspective 
and background on these countries. 
  My statistical analysis of the model I have outlined in figure 1.2 will probably 
reveal differences between the countries in several respects. However, my main 
interest is to be able to say something generally about the protest voting that takes 
place in these countries. If the five Radical Right Parties that I have chosen operate in 
similar contexts, I believe that will increase the chances of finding common effects in 
my analyses; or at least some effects that are comparable. Protest voting and political 
distrust probably has a similar meaning and stems from some of the same sources in 
countries that are alike. But if I were to include a very different country in my analysis, 
like India or Russia who both have Radical Right Parties; chances are that protest 
voting is an entire different phenomenon there. Even if a statistical analysis provides 
similar results in these very different countries, the appropriate interpretation of those 
results may vary. Hence, I will look at the four countries I have chosen, to see if they 
are similar enough for my analytical purpose. 
 The question is then what standard I should apply when I evaluate the 
similarities between the countries. In order to answer that question, I will make use of 
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Lijphart (1975) and Frendreis’ (1983) term “contextual variables”. Those are variables 
that are not a direct part of the analytical model, yet they could potentially have an 
effect on the analysis. One means of controlling for the effects of contextual variables, 
is through a “most similar” comparative analysis. When employing that method, the 
researcher selects cases that are similar in terms of context, yet the operative variables 
have different values in each case (Frendreis 1983, p260; Lijphart 1975, pp.163-165). I 
do not wish to perform that type of comparative analysis5, but I do want to control for 
context in my analysis, and in my interpretation of the results. Hence, I want any 
relevant contextual variables to vary as little as possible between cases. I do not have 
any more specific standard than that, so my discussion of these variables will be 
somewhat intuitive. What is important, though, is that there are no large differences 
between the countries, which could affect my analysis. 
 
Contextual Variables 
At first glance, it may appear as if Austria sits uncomfortably in a comparison with the 
Scandinavian countries. The histories and political parties of these countries are 
different in many respects. So, while the three Scandinavian countries seem ripe for 
this type of analysis, Austria does look like the deviant case. That is mainly due to its 
political history, which especially in connection with the Second World War, deviates 
from that of Scandinavia. Austrians’ relation to this part of their history is much more 
troublesome and tense than in the Scandinavian cases. It is plausible that different 
memories of Nazism have an effect on current the Radical Right Parties, and their 
success or failure. 
However, these objections are not necessarily relevant to my research. I have 
limited my analysis to studying the support of Radical Right Parties in recent history. 
Hence, I will only look at contextual variables that are relevant to the success, failure 
and the general operation of Radical Right Parties. In order to identify these variables, 
I will take a look at the literature on RRPs. 
                                              
5 The differences between a “most-similar” comparative analysis and what I intend to do, is that I will treat these 
countries as a group or a unit, in which I perform my analysis. In a comparative analysis, the researcher focuses 
more on differences between countries, and the possible explanations for those differences. Still, both means of 
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Before I get into the relevant variables in this respect, I should mention a few 
words about my level of analysis. Even though I will perform a study at the individual 
level of analysis, most of the contextual variables are at the aggregate level. As such, 
they do not have a direct effect on my analytical model. But that does not mean that 
they are irrelevant. Various aggregate features of a country do have an effect on 
individuals. The variable of “unemployment” is a case in point. It affects people’s 
perception of the economy, and it says something about the difficulties of obtaining 
jobs. Therefore, it dos not make sense to exclude it, based on the methodological 
criterion that it has a different level of analysis. If find it to be relevant, as long as it 
could interfere with my analysis, indirectly or directly; i.e. that it is part of the context 
in which my analysis takes place. With this less rigorous criterion in mind, I will now 
try to identify the relevant variables from the literature.  
Goul Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) emphasize the effect of a high level of 
taxation in the 1970s, for the success of the two Progress Parties. I will start by 
looking at taxation. 
In the late 1980s, immigration became the new hot topic (Goul Andersen and 
Bjørklund 1990). After a period of increased immigration from Third World 
Countries, almost every Radical Right Party in Europe emerged as the main opponents 
of liberal immigration policies in their respective countries. Thus, each country’s level 
of immigration could have an effect on the success or failure of Radical Right Parties 
(Betz 1994, pp. 69-72). 
Furthermore, some researchers have argued that the combination of 
immigration and high unemployment strengthens RRP support. These coinciding 
developments give weight to the Radical Right Parties’ arguments that immigrants 
deprive natives of their jobs (Betz 1994, pp. 85-89 and Knigge 1999, p260). Others 
have argued that unemployed people generally prefer radical political solutions such as 
those offered by RRPs (Arter 1999). That argument bears resemblance to some 
explanations of the success of fascism in the 1930s. Irrespective of which argument is 
correct, I need to look at each country’s level of unemployment. 
                                                                                                                                             
analysis require that contextual variables are controlled for. That is why I employ Lijphart (1975) and Frendreis’ 
(1983) terms in this respect. 
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Both Taggart (1996, p51) and Kitschelt (1997, p11) emphasize the importance 
of a developed welfare state for the success of RRPs. I will use welfare spending as a 
measure of the size of the welfare state. 
 The same two researchers also argue that RRPs are products of the Western 
European countries’ transition from industrialism to a postindustrial society and 
economy. Hence, I will also measure the degree of postindustrialism in each country, 
and use that as a contextual variable. 
 Finally, I will add three political factors to my list of context variables. They 
have all been used in the literature on Radical Right Parties, as explanations of success 
or failure. One is the electoral system, which could limit the opportunities for new 
parties (Miller and Listhaug 1990). Some also believe that a high degree of (ii) 
corporatism and (iii) consociationalism lead to successful RRPs (Taggart 1996). 
I will take a look at each of these variables in the four countries I have selected 
for my study. I do not intend to dwell on details, but I will rather try to give an 
intuitive sense of these variables, and how they have developed over time. After all, 
they are not part of my main analysis, and thus, do not warrant an extensive 
discussion. I will use some empirical data, as well as a literature study on some 
variables. Thereby, I hope I will be able to determine if the countries are sufficiently 
similar for my main analysis.  
 
Taxation 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the level of taxation in each of the four countries. Their 
differences appear to have grown from the 1960s to the 1980s, with Sweden ending at 
the highest level of taxation, and Austria at the lowest. It is tempting to suggest that the 
influential FPÖ in Austria has managed to hold down the tax-increase, while the tax 
revenue in Sweden has been unchecked by any strong party of the Radical Right. Of 
course this is speculation on my part; there could be a number of other explanations. 
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Figure 1.3 Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP from 1965 to 
1988, in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden
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Despite some differences in taxation, the figure displays the same trend in each of the 
four countries: they have gradually increased their taxes from 1965 to 1988. Austria’s 
tax revenue was somewhat lower than in the other countries from 1970 onwards. But 
overall, these countries appear to tax their citizens at a roughly similar level. 
 
Immigration 
I do not have accurate statistics on the exact numbers of immigrants in the four 
countries. The available immigration statistics does not have the same definitions and 
categories in the four countries, which makes it difficult to compare them directly. 
Hence, I will use some other data-sources to give a sense of the scale of immigration 
to the four countries. I will start with current numbers of refugees. 
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There were about 82 500 refugees living in Austria, in 1999. The corresponding 
figures in Norway were 47 800; in Denmark, 69 000; and in Sweden, 159 6006. These 
data indicate a good deal of variation between cases. Sweden has by far the greatest 
refugee population. Again, that may be explained by the lack of an “anti-immigration” 
Radical Right Party in this country, for more than a short period of time. However, 
there are several other factors at play in the complex issue of immigration statistics. 
What is more surprising is the relatively low number of refugees in Austria. 
Austria shares a border with the former Yugoslavia, and is close to most other Eastern 
European countries. It is plausible that these factors would lead to a substantially 
higher rate of immigration in Austria than in the Scandinavian countries. Apparently, 
that is not the case. 
Current refugee-numbers are not a sufficient measure of the rate of 
immigration. Goul Andersen and Bjørklund (2001) suggest that relative changes can 
be equally important. They argue that increased levels of non-western immigrants 
living in Denmark and Norway have boosted the support for the two Progress Parties. 
This is an effect of relative change, which occurs despite modest overall numbers of 
immigrants in the two countries7. I believe Goul Andersen and Bjørklund’s finding 
indicate that I should also study development over time in each of the four countries. 
In order to do that, I have chosen a measure used by Betz (1994, p77), which I will 
make a slight improvement on. He uses absolute numbers of asylum seekers in 
European countries. I believe these numbers should be controlled for inhabitants in 
each country. Hence, figure 1.4 shows asylum applications per 1000 inhabitants from 
1980 to 1999. 
The figure confirms that there is some variation between countries. The period 
around the end of the Cold War saw the greatest variation, with Norway at the lowest 
level and Sweden at the highest. In the early 1980s, Sweden and Austria were the only 
countries to receive applications. Austria’s unique geographic position appears to have 
had an effect at that time, as it got the largest number of applications. 1981 is a 
                                              
6 UNHCR population data 1999. 
7 “Non-western” immigrants in Norway constitute 3.2 percent of the population, and about 3 percent in 
Denmark. However, these figures are the result of a doubling of the number of immigrants from 1987 to 1997 
(Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2001). 
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noticeable year in that respect. However, there are some similarities between the 
countries. First of all, each country experienced a rapid increase in applications, at 
some point between 1989 and 1993. Second, the diverging trends in the figure appear 
to stabilize toward the end of the 1990s, as the four countries received similar, though 
not identical levels of applications. The relative similarities are surprising given the 
apparent differences between the countries, both in terms of geography and current 
refugee populations. Since my analysis will focus on the 1990s, I will consider the 
countries as similar enough in this respect. 
Figure 1.4 Asylum applications per 1000 inhabitants in Austria, 
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden; from 1980 to 1999
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Sources: Asylum applicants: UNHCR Statistics: Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR - 1999 
Statistical Overview. Populations: Statistik Austria, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Danmarks statistik, and 
Statistiska Centralbyrån. 
Finally, I should make a methodological point. The data in figure 1.2 is based 
on the number of asylum applications in each country. It does not measure rejections 
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of these applications. Ideally, I should have controlled for rejections. That would give 
a more accurate picture of the real numbers of people settling in these countries. But 
rejections sometimes come years after the applications, and that makes it difficult to 
perform such a control. I have tried to compensate for that in figure A.1 in the 
appendix. It presents a similar measure of rejections, which amplifies on the 
information in figure 1.4. The numbers in that figure also stabilizes in the latter half of 
the 1990s. In addition, figure A.1 makes some of the tops in figure 1.2 seem less 
dramatic. For instance, the large number of applications to Sweden in 1992 is followed 
by an increase in rejections the following year. 
 
Unemployment 
Scholars have for some time discussed the relationship between rising unemployment-
rates, and support for Radical Right Parties. Betz (1994) argues that there is a positive 
correlation between the two, while Knigge (1998) find no connection whatsoever. Nor 
does she find a combined effect of immigration and unemployment, as one might 
expect from some of the literature (p267). I found surprisingly contradictory evidence 
in my data. In Austria, there is a strong positive correlation between FPÖ election 
results, and unemployment since 19708. In Denmark, the correlation is equally strong, 
but negative9. There is no significant correlation in Norway. 
These results should not be used to draw definitive conclusions. That would 
require a more thorough analysis, for which these data are a good starting point. 
However, in the present context, I am able to conclude that there might be some kind 
of connection, and that illustrates the need to study this variable. I have attempted to 
do that in figure 1.5, which displays the unemployment-rates in each of the four 
countries, from 1969 to the present. 
The evidence indicates that Denmark had the highest level of unemployment 
for most of this period. Austria, Norway, and Sweden had a low level of 
unemployment until the mid- or late 1980s. There appears to be considerable variation 
between cases in the 1990s. Still, I would argue that when Denmark moved below the 
                                              
8 Pearson’s r: .87, significant at the 1%-level. Based on the data in figure 1.3, and official election results. 
9 Pearson’s r: -.82, significant at the 1%-level. Based on the data in figure 1.3, and official election results. 
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10%-limit, all four countries should be considered to have a low level of 
unemployment. There is some variation, but not to such an extent that unemployment 
disqualifies as a “contextual variable”. Granted, this is not the only possible conclusion 
from figure 1.5. 
 
Figure 1.5 Unemployment in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and 
Sweden from 1969 to 1999. Percent of workforce
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Source: ILO Labor statistics, www.laborsta.ilo.org 
 
Welfare expenditures 
Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden all have extensive and generous welfare-
systems (Taggart 1996, pp. 51-54). As can be seen in table 1.2, spending on welfare 
constitute more than half of all government expenditures in these countries. It is a 
stable, and roughly similar expense in each case. I have also included a measure of 
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variance in the table. That is, the difference between the highest and the lowest level of 
spending each year. Variance, in this sense, decreases over time, and hence, the 
countries become even more similar. 
 The data in table 1.2 is less than ideal for my purpose, since it does not cover 
the main period of my analysis: the 1990s. There is a possibility that there have been 
some major changes since 1985, and that weakens any conclusions based on table 1.2. 
Despite this fault, I will consider it unlikely that this variable varies to such an extent 
that it moves beyond the range of a “contextual variable.” 
 
Table 1.2 Welfare expenditures, of total government 
expenditure, in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, 
from 1970 to 1985. Percent 
 1970 1980 1985
Austria 56.5 57.4 61,7
Norway 55.0 55.8 57.3
Denmark 63.3 61.9 64.4
Sweden 52.9 53.2 56.7
Difference between lowest 
and highest level 10.4 8.7 7.7
Source: Peters 1991, p236. 
 
Postindustrialism 
Scholars have argued that the transition from an industrial to a postindustrial society 
was an important contributing factor to the emergence of Radical Right Parties in 
Europe (Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1997; Taggart 1996). In order to determine whether such 
a transition has taken place, I will try to provide a measure of postindustrialism. This is 
not an easy task. Scholars have produced different definitions of the term, and I will 
not be able to capture every possible interpretation. However, most political scientists 
emphasize the same two variables: higher education and employment in the service-
sector (see e.g. Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1997). I will use both as indicators of 
postindustrialism, and thus, as contextual variables.  
Figure 1.6 shows a stark increase in higher education enrollment, in each of the 
four countries. The rate of increase is surprisingly similar in each case. Austria, 
Denmark, and Sweden have almost the exact same level of enrollment in the 1990s, 
with Norway at a slightly higher level. The variation between cases is marginal. It is 
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especially so, compared to the dramatic variation over time in each of the four 
countries. In that sense, figure 1.6 illustrates an almost perfect example of a contextual 
variable. 
Figure 1.6 Levels of enrollment in higher education*, in Austria, 
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, from the 1970's to the 1990's.
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Source: UNESCO statistics, at http://unescostat.unesco.org 
* Enrollment levels are measured by “gross enrollment ratios”. That is, the “total enrollment in a specific level 
of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age populate corresponding to 
the same level of education in a given school-year” (http://unescostat.unesco.org). 
 
By contrast, figure 1.7 illustrates some stark differences between the countries. 
It displays the level of service-sector employment in each of the four countries. The 
three Scandinavian countries vary at a similar rate, while Austria, no doubt, is a 
deviant case. The Austrian work force has not reached the Scandinavian level of 
employment in the “postindustrial” sector. However, the figure does show an increase 
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in service sector employment in each of the four countries, which indicates a similar 
trend. But overall, Austria is a deviant case in this respect. 
In sum, the two postindustrial indicators provide a mixed picture. The education 
measure displays a remarkable degree of similarity; while sector employment differs 
to a greater extent. If each variable showed this kind of ambiguity, I would be forced 
to abandon my presumption that the countries are sufficiently similar. So far however, 
this variable appears to be the exception. 
Figure 1.7 Employment in the service sector*, in Austria, Norway, 
Denmark, and Sweden, from the 1970's to the 1990's. Percent of 
employed citizens
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* The tertiary sector includes the following work-categories: wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels; 
transport, storage, and communication; financing, insurance, real estate, and business services; and community, 
social, and personal services. 
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Electoral systems 
All four countries use Proportional Representation (PR) in elections for Parliaments. 
They also employ similar thresholds for the representation of small parties. Austria, 
Norway, and Sweden have 4% thresholds, with some differences in how the thresholds 
are applied. In theory, the Austrian threshold only relates to the distribution of a few 
seats in Parliament; but in practice it functions as an absolute threshold10. The 
Norwegian threshold does only relate to the distribution of eight seats by national 
election results. Each county distributes the other 157 seats, without using a threshold. 
So, in effect, Norway has a very low threshold. The Swedish threshold of 4% is 
absolute, while in Denmark it is set at 2%. 
Miller and Listhaug (1990) let the relatively small differences between Norway 
and Sweden account for the fact that Sweden does not have a Radical Right Party, 
while Norway does. I find that to be an unsatisfactory explanation. Most of the 
contextual variables I have dealt with in this section are possible contributors to the 
success of Radical Right Parties. Electoral systems, on the other hand, only serve as 
limitations on the activities of new or small parties. They cannot give a sufficient 
explanation for the success or failure of one type of political party or another. 
Proportional Representation might enhance the success of some Radical Right Parties. 
Yet, the success of the National Front in France shows that majoritarian systems need 
not be an insurmountable obstacle. Therefore, I find this contextual variable less 
important that others I have dealt with thus far. The similarities between the countries 
that I have described here are sufficient for my purpose. 
 
Corporatism 
My last two contextual variables are related, but should be treated as distinct concepts. 
Corporatism involves cooperation across political and economic spheres, while 
consociationalism also includes religious, ethnic and cultural cleavages (Taggart 1996, 
p14). Lane and Ersson define “corporatism” as a system in which “big interest 
organizations conduct far-reaching negotiations to reconcile peacefully their interests 
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and where the same hierarchically structured organizations partake in various forms in 
government policy-making, in the framing and implementation of policies in formally 
designed channels” (1991, pp. 36-37). 
 The degree of corporatism in Austria and the Scandinavian countries gives 
reason to separate them from the rest of Europe. Researchers on European politics 
usually make that distinction on the basis of the influence of these countries’ interest 
groups. Some of these groups are involved in both government policy-making and 
implementation. The political parties also cooperate closely and openly with labor 
organizations and other interest groups (Lane and Ersson pp. 257-260; Schmitter 1991; 
Taggart 1996 pp. 14-15). Similar traits can be observed in other European countries, 
but not to the same extent as in these cases. This makes the four countries unique in 
the European context. Thus, in terms of corporatism in these four countries, they are 
certainly similar. 
 
Consociationalism 
Lijphart (1979) defines Austria as a “consensus-democracy”, just like he does the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland. The defining traits of these democracies are 
cooperation, consensus, and minority rights. They are plural societies, in which 
political, economic, religious, cultural, and ethnic cleavages create separate and 
distinct communities within each country. In these countries, consociationalism is a 
necessary tool to forge coherent and acceptable policies to all parties, and to keep the 
country united (Lijphart 1984, pp. 21-32). 
 Most political scientists do not consider the Scandinavian countries to fall 
within this category (Heidar and Berntzen 1998; Lijphart 1979). That may indicate that 
Austria and Scandinavia should not be grouped together in an analysis. I do not 
believe so. Lijphart probably exaggerated the consociationalism of Austrian politics at 
the time of his analysis. Furthermore, Austrian politics has changed considerably since 
that time. 
                                                                                                                                             
10 Because of the small electoral districts in Austria, it is very difficult to gain any of the other “non-threshold” 
seats without getting at least 4 percent in the national tally. Hence, breaking the threshold is the only realistic 
hope for a small party to gain representation. 
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The three groups or “lagers” of Austrian politics are not as separate and distinct 
as, for instance, the different cultural and political groups of the Netherlands. Austria’s 
political parties are no longer as closely connected to specific social groups as they 
used to be. Rather, they have become “catch-all”-parties who cross social boundaries. 
And finally, Austria is not as ethnically or religiously diverse as Lijphart’s description 
might suggest (Heidar and Berntzen 1998, p209, Lane and Ersson 1991, pp. 257-260, 
and Luther 1992). In sum, Austria may have been a “consensus-democracy” at some 
point, but it can no longer be characterized as such. Thus, do not consider differences 
in terms of consociationalism to be a barrier against my comparison of Austria and the 
Scandinavian countries in the 1990s. 
 
Sufficiently Similar 
Having looked at nine variables, I feel confident in concluding that the four countries 
are sufficiently similar for further analysis. That is not to say that Austrian politics and 
society is the same as in the Scandinavian countries. Austria deviates from the other 
countries in many respects. However, in terms of these nine factors that influence 
Radical Right Party success or failure, I find an acceptable degree of similarity. These 
results indicate that I will not encounter any major “disturbances” in my analysis, by 
the fact that I have grouped these four countries together. I can perform a statistical 
analysis of these countries and their RRP-supporters, without having to worry about 
contextual variables. This detour from my main analytical purpose, which I hope has 
given the reader sufficient background on these countries, enables me to focus only on 
the statistical analysis. First however, I will provide some more background, as I take a 
closer look at the Radical Right Parties I have chosen for my study. I believe my 
description will further amplify and illustrate the similarities between my selected 
cases. 
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Four Countries and Five Political Parties 
Austria – the Freedom Party 
The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is the most successful Radical Right Party among 
the five parties in my study. It was founded in 1955 as an attempt to replace the short-
lived and discredited League of Independents (VdU). Most VdU members were 
previous nazi-officials. As a result of the peace settlement in 1955, that party 
disappeared from the political scene (Morrow 2000, p41). The new FPÖ leaders tried 
to distance themselves from Austria’s past by presenting the party as a centrist 
advocate of reform (Betz 1994, p11). Until the 1980s, FPÖ gained around 5 percent of 
the votes in national elections, but it hardly had any influence. The Social Democrats 
(SPÖ) and the Christian-Democratic People’s Party (ÖVP) dominated Austrian 
politics in the postwar era, which excluded FPÖ from any real power. These two 
parties formed coalition governments that assured a high degree of stability to the 
country’s political life. Austria’s turbulent past, as well as its critical position on the 
frontlines of the Cold War, made most Austrians support this rigid arrangement 
(Heidar and Berntzen 1998, pp. 206-209). 
After a conflict between fractions of the FPÖ, Jörg Haider emerged as the new 
leader in 1986. He changed the party into a “modern” Radical Right Party by focusing 
on immigration, market liberalism, and opposition to the dominance of the two major 
parties and their “spoils-system”11 (Morrow 2000, pp. 46-52). The result was a gradual 
increase in support to the top level of 26.9 percent in 1999. That election led to an 
unprecedented governing coalition between the FPÖ and the ÖVP. The Freedom Party 
secured a number of cabinet posts, while the leader of ÖVP became Prime Minister. 
The inclusion of FPÖ in government led to massive international protests, most 
notably from the European Union. 
 
Norway – the Progress Party 
Anders Lange, a Norwegian dog-kennel owner and magazine editor, formed his own 
political party in 1973. The unambiguous name of this new Radical Right Party was 
                                              
11 The “spoils-” or “proportz-system” was an arrangement by which jobs, housing, and government contracts 
were distributed according to party affiliation to the two major parties (Betz 1994, p50). 
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Anders Lange’s Party or a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties, and Public Intervention. 
It received 5.0 percent of the votes in the so-called “earthquake election” of 1973. This 
event changed Norwegian politics in several respects12. The Labor Party, Norway’s 
main governing party, got around 45 percent support up until 1973. That year it 
decreased to 35.3 percent. Anders Lange’s success stemmed in part from his protest 
against the Labor policies of expanding the welfare system and increasing taxes. To 
the dismay of Lange and his supporters, the non-socialist government from 1965 to 
1971 continued the same line of policy. Thus, the opposition to Labor seemed both 
weak and unprincipled (Bjørklund 2000, p443). By contrast, Lange introduced an 
uncompromising political program. Its main elements were reductions in welfare 
spending, lower taxes, and cuts in government bureaucracies (Iversen 1998, pp. 23-
24). 
Anders Lange died shortly after his election to Parliament. A few years later, 
the new party leader, Carl I. Hagen, changed the party’s name to the Progress Party. 
During the 1980s, the issue of immigration became increasingly important for the 
party. It was particularly important for the “second breakthrough” in the 1987 local 
elections13 (Bjørklund 1988, pp213-214). Despite internal conflicts during the 1990s, 
the party has expanded its electoral base (see table 1). 
 
Denmark – the Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party 
The Danish Progress Party was formed in 1972 by the millionaire tax-lawyer Morgens 
Glistrup. He became famous a year earlier for arguing in favor of tax evasion on 
national television (Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 1990, p196). As in the case of 
Anders Lange, Glistrup’s party entered the political stage in a 1973 “earthquake 
election”14. But Glistrup’s success was greater than that of Lange in Norway. The 
                                              
12 David Arter (1999) includes this in his list of Scandinavian “earthquake elections”. In addition to Anders 
Lange’s success, the new and relatively short-lived Liberal People’s Party also gained some representation. As 
did the Socialist Electoral Alliance, which was an attempt by some parties of the political left to form an 
alliance. 
13 Those were local elections, in which Progress gained 10.4 percent at the municipal level, and 12.3 percent in 
elections for county councils. 
14 The term “earthquake election” comes from David Arter (1999). In 1973, three new parties emerged to take 
seats in Parliament: the Center Democrats, the Christian People’s Party, and Progress. Consequently, the older 
established parties decreased their share of seats, and the Danish party system entered an era of greater volatility 
(Heidar and Berntzen 1998, pp. 78-82). 
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Danish Progress Party gained 15.9 percent of the votes in its first election. Prior to this 
dramatic event in Danish politics, the Labor Party had been the country’s main 
political force (Arter 1999, p71). They got around 40 percent of the votes in most 
national elections in the postwar era, but in 1973 they had to settle for only 25.6 
percent. 
The 1970s was a successful period for the Progress Party (see table 1). For most 
of the decade, they emphasized policies such as tax cuts, reducing bureaucracies, and 
cuts in government spending, especially on welfare (Arter 1999, p104). During the 
1980s, they turned their focus toward the anti-immigration stance that is common to 
most Radical Right Parties (Goul Andersen 1992, p198). The issue was somewhat 
obscured by the internal conflicts in the party, which is probably why the Progress 
Party did not gain the same level of support as in the 1970s. These conflicts stemmed 
from disagreements about political strategy, and a struggle for personal power. They 
escalated in the mid-1990, and finally led to the formation of a new party, the Danish 
People’s Party, under the leadership of Pia Kjærsgaard. The party succeeded in 
replacing Progress in the 1998 election, as the main Radical Right Party in Denmark, 
and it strengthened that position in the 2001-election (see table 1.1; Goul Andersen 
and Bjørklund 2001). 
 
Sweden – New Democracy 
Sweden’s New Democracy is the least successful Radical Right Party of those I am 
studying. It emerged prior to the parliamentary election of 1991, in which it had its 
most successful result of 6.7 percent of the vote. It has not gained any political seats 
since. Again, this breakthrough election for a Radical Right Party has been called an 
“earthquake election” (Arter 1999, pp. 106-109). It represented a break with the 
established “postwar consensus” in Sweden (Betz 1994, pp. 46-47; Heidar and 
Berntzen 1998, pp. 67-69). After the Second World War, and prior to 1991, the Labor 
Party never got less than 40 percent of the votes in elections for Parliament. Labor 
governed Sweden for most of that period, while the opposition was limited to four 
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parties15. By 1991, three new significant parties had emerged16. One of those had a 
“radical right appeal” based on opposition to immigration and social expenditures, 
favoring lower taxes; with the slogan “life must be more fun” (Betz 1994, p9). For a 
Swedish election campaign, that was a highly unusual political platform. 
As a result of a conflict between the founders of New Democracy, Ian 
Wachtmeister and Bert Karlsson, the party broke up and lost most of its support in the 
1994 election. 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
I have now introduced the topic of my research, and its more specific research 
questions and hypotheses. I have also discussed the “comparability” of the four 
countries I have selected, and I have provided some background and information on 
the cases. 
 I will divide the analytical part of my dissertation into the four remaining 
chapters. I hope to resolve most theoretical issues and problems in the next chapter, 
which I will organize in accordance with figure 1.2. I will start the chapter with a 
discussion of the category “Radical Right Parties”, and continue with a look at the 
variable “political trust”. I will then discuss the final variable of “issues and belief 
systems”, and try to form an overall theoretical approach to the multivariate model. 
 Chapter three introduces my empirical data, and my approach for utilizing 
them. I will make several methodological choices, both in terms of operative variables 
and analytical tools. 
I will attempt to perform a thorough analysis of all my research questions and 
hypotheses in chapter four. I will start with a simple bivariate model, and move toward 
a more complex multivariate model in my final analysis. 
In chapter five, I will attempt to release myself from the specific data analysis, 
and discuss the implications of my findings. It seems to me that some of the 
condemnations of RRP-supporters can be related to citizenship-norms. I will discuss 
                                              
15 The Conservative Party, the Center Party, the Liberals, and the Leftist Party. 
16 In addition to New Democracy who got 6.7 percent of the vote, the Christian Democrats got 7.1 percent of the 
vote. They competed in several elections prior to 1991, but that election constituted a breakthrough. The Greens’ 
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some of these norms and their applicability, both in terms of RRP voters and the 
general population in modern societies. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
breakthrough came in the previous election of 1988, and in 1991 they lost their seats in Parliament. But, they 
later regained those seats and had continued success through the 1990s (Heidar and Berntzen 1998, pp. 64 -68). 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Any reader of political science literature on protest voting, political distrust, and 
Radical Right Parties, has experienced the problematic and diffuse nature of some of 
the terms in these fields of research. Definitions of concepts vary from one researcher 
to another, and more often than not, there is substantial ambiguity as to the meaning of 
some terms. I believe several of these works suffer from a lack of a clearly defined 
theoretical and methodological approach. 
 In this chapter, I will deal with theoretical issues that are relevant to my 
research. I aim to provide an approach that is both logically coherent and substantially 
accurate. The first point is clearly important in any theoretical discussion, but I find it 
equally important to have an approach that will be useful to my empirical analysis. To 
ensure that I fulfill both requirements, I will use figure 1.2, as a point of reference 
throughout this chapter. It incorporates the relevant terms that are in need of an 
analytical discussion, and I will use it as the starting point for my analysis in chapter 
four. Thus, the figure serves as a link between theory and the actual analysis. 
 Figure 1.2 consists of four variables. The dependent variable, “support for a 
Radical Right Party”, is a question of voting or voting intention. It is a seemingly 
unproblematic variable, yet it does not clarify the meaning of “Radical Right Parties”. 
If the five parties I have selected do not belong to a coherent “family” of political 
parties, I will not be able to do a comparative analysis. If that is the case, it will not 
make sense to compare the act of voting for the Norwegian Progress Party, with voting 
for the Austrian Freedom Party, for instance. However, if the parties belong to the 
same party family, their electorates are likely to be motivated by similar factors in 
each country. So far, I have assumed that that is the case. The academic literature does 
not take that for granted (Mudde 1996); nor do the parties themselves. Most refuse to 
acknowledge their relation to any other parties, since they claim to be unique and do 
not want to be associated with any “foreign parties”. I need to resolve this question, 
and will discuss it at some length in the following section of this chapter. 
 My model also includes two variables that concern political trust. I have 
distinguished between “system distrust” and “elite distrust”. That distinction as well as 
other choices that I have to make with respect to the variable “political trust”, connect 
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to a long debate in political science. It is a complex debate that has both theoretical 
and methodological implications. In this chapter, I will review some of the most 
significant contributions to the debate, and start to develop my own approach. I will 
deal with related methodological issues in chapter three. By taking both theory and 
methodology into account, I intend to develop a new approach. It will differ somewhat 
from that of previous researchers, but I believe it will be both accurate and useful to 
my analysis. 
 The final variable in figure 1.2 is “issues and belief systems”. It is not as 
problematic and diffuse as e.g. “political trust”, and does not require an equally 
extensive theoretical discussion. I will only discuss its relevancy to my model of 
protest voting. 
 In the final part of this chapter, I will take an overall theoretical look at my 
model. I hope it will then appear as a reasonable approach to the study of protest 
voting. 
 
A Coherent Party Family? 
It has become customary to use the concept of “party families” in political party 
research. Researchers in this field argue that parties in different countries can be seen 
as specific expressions of more general “cleavage structures” in modern societies. That 
idea comes from Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) theory of “Cleavage Structures, Party 
Systems, and Voter Alignments”. They argued that important historic events had a 
profound effect on the party systems of some European countries. The so-called 
“national” and “industrial” revolutions were particularly important, in that they 
produced cleavages that are still relevant today. Most European countries have gone 
through these “revolutions” in their process of nation building. They have made 
different choices at these points in their histories, but they have still gone through the 
same process. This has led to the formation of relatively similar political parties in 
different countries. These groups of similar political parties are usually called “party 
families”. Conservative parties or socialist parties are cases in point. 
 In modern European societies it appears as if a new “family” of political parties 
has developed, namely Radical Right Parties. Maybe these societies have gone through 
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some kind of a “postindustrial revolution” that among other things led to the formation 
of a new family of political parties (see e.g. Kitschelt 1997). In this section, I will take 
a look at available literature on RRPs, and see what it says about this idea. By means 
of a literature study, I intend to determine whether RRPs are a coherent family of 
political parties. 
 
The Collective Hunch 
Most researchers agree that there is a distinct “party family” on the European Radical 
Right. The same scholars usually concur that the five parties in my analysis are 
included in this family (Mudde 1996, p234). Nevertheless, it is difficult to read a firm 
conclusion from the literature on this topic. The researchers use different arguments, 
which are filled with exceptions and uncertainties. Mudde’s (1996) qualified remarks 
is a case in point: 
Even while it might be true that these parties are more difficult to compare than 
parties of other families, this should not be seen as a reason to ignore our collective 
‘hunch’ that there is something common about these parties (p226). 
 
 The researchers’ preferred mode of analysis is to argue in favor of a few 
defining characteristics for the Radical Right, which they proceed to test against real-
life cases. The defining characteristics vary markedly from one researcher to another17, 
yet they all reach the same conclusion: that there is a distinct “party family” on the 
Radical Right. This paradoxical situation, in which different arguments lead to the 
same conclusions, makes Mudde (1996) criticize this established method. I believe he 
rightly argues that it would be better to start by studying the parties, and look for 
common defining characteristics later (p244). Still, I believe it will benefit my analysis 
to a look at some of the most influential of these arguments. 
 
Definitions and Categories 
The simplest definitions of Radical Right Parties consist of just a single defining 
feature. In those cases, the researcher usually names the party family by that one 
characteristic. Typical examples are “Anti-Immigration Parties” (Van Der Burg et al 
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2000), and “Discontent Parties” (Lane and Ersson 1991, p108). Most scholars 
disapprove of this approach, and argue that the RRPs are more complex than what 
these definitions imply (Fennema 1997). Betz’ (1998) definition is slightly more 
complex, in that he employs two defining features: “pragmatic radicalism” and 
“populist appeal” (p3). On that basis, he incorporates more than a dozen political 
parties, including the Scandinavian and Austrian Radical Right Parties. 
Husbands (1992) uses a similarly parsimonious approach. He argues: “what 
(…) unites all of these parties is their particular commitment to some sort of ethnic 
exclusionism – a hostility to foreigners, immigrants, Third-World asylum-seekers, and 
similar outgroups – as well as aggressive nationalism or localism” (p268). He further 
groups the parties into five categories: “populist-nationalist parties” (p269), “neo-
Fascist parties” (p273), “nationalist extreme-right parties” (p279), “traditional 
xenophobic parties” (p281), and “militant neo-Nazism” (p282). The first category 
consists of my selected cases, as well as the Italian Northern League. Hence, Husbands 
clearly sees my selected cases as part of the same distinctive type of Radical Right 
Parties. 
 Some of the most respected and oft-quoted contributions to the debate about 
Radical Right Parties, are those of Piero Ignazi. He uses three criteria, through which 
he distinguishes between “old” and “new” “Extreme Right Parties”. Both types of 
parties on the “Extreme” or “Radical” Right are characterized by a placement to the far 
right in their respective party-systems. Thus, the first criterion states that leaders and 
voters of these parties should display “rightist” attitudes (Ignazi 1992, pp. 7-9). 
According to the second criterion, “the extreme right parties should exhibit ‘opposition 
of principle’ and should express an ideology which undermines the constitutional rules 
of the democratic regime” (ibid. p12). The distinction between “old” and “new” RRPs 
relates to the third and final criterion: “the declared party ideology and its reference to 
fascism”. Ignazi argues that the old RRPs are fascist, while newer parties of the 
Radical Right do not display any coherent ideology (1997, pp. 52-54). The prototype 
of “new” RRPs is the French National Front (Ignazi 1997, p57), while the Austrian 
                                                                                                                                             
17 Mudde (1996) found 26 definitions in the literature, in which 58 different features were mentioned at least 
once (p229). 
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and Scandinavian parties are “doubtful” cases for inclusion (1992, pp. 13-15). I 
interpret this to mean that they are less radical versions of the “new” RRPs. In that 
sense, Ignazi does argue that my selected cases are similar types of political parties 
(1992 p15, and 1997 p53). 
 Herbert Kitschelt’s (1997) approach to this debate is characteristic of political 
science researchers. He sets out with two criteria for inclusion in the Radical Right 
“party family”, which he tests against his empirical evidence. They are ”(1) whether a 
party’s competitors perceive it to be located ‘on the right’ and not a viable coalition 
partner, and (2) when the party appeared on the political scene” (p49). He argues that 
the parties should have appeared since the second half of the 1960s (p49). The party 
that best fulfills these criteria is the French National Front. It is the ideal-type of a 
“New Radical Right” party (p91), while the Scandinavian parties are “milder versions” 
within the same category (p121). The Austrian FPÖ does not fulfill either of the two 
criteria; nevertheless, it is part of the same “family tree”. Kitschelt categorizes it as a 
“populist anti-statist” party. As such, it is particularly distinguishable by its early anti-
democratic history (p159), and its current opposition to corporatism and the elite 
political culture (p161). 
 Kitschelt’s distinctions run contrary to my selection of the Austrian and 
Scandinavian parties for comparative analysis. He argues that there are fundamental 
differences between the appeal and successes of the FPÖ on the one hand, and the 
Scandinavian RRPs on the other. This is not a generally accepted distinction. The 
researchers I have referred to in this section consider these parties to be members of 
the same party family. Moreover, to the extent that these researchers make distinctions 
between different types of Radical Right Parties, they include my selected cases in the 
same category.  
 I believe that Kitschelt’s analysis suffers from a “static” viewpoint. He 
explicitly points out that his research “ignores dynamic change in each country’s 
rightist mobilization over time” (1997, p48). In this sense, Kitschelt’s mode of analysis 
deviates from most other researchers, who emphasize the dynamic and changing 
nature of these parties. Evans et al (2001), for instance, make a point of some crucial 
changes in recent years. They argue that the parties on the European Radical Right 
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have gone through a process of consolidation. The parties got started for different 
reasons, and in different national contexts, but in the last few years they have become 
increasingly similar. Thus, dynamic change makes these parties more similar, and 
thereby strengthens the argument that there is a coherent party family on the Radical 
Right. Kitschelt does not take these developments into account. That is why I will not 
consider his distinctions a valid objection to my comparative approach.  
 
The Danish People’s Party 
Most of the researchers I have quoted above study four of the five cases I will include 
in my analysis: the Austrian Freedom Party, the Danish and Norwegian Progress 
Parties, and the Swedish New Democracy. They do not look at the Danish People’s 
Party; and for obvious reasons: most of the research was conducted prior to that 
party’s first electoral contest in 1998. It is now only starting to get noticed by 
researchers. Goul Andersen and Bjørklund (2001) do analyze it in their recent research 
on Scandinavian RRPs. They argue that the Danish People’s Party is the “main 
successor of the Progress Party”, and should be analyzed as such. I accept that 
generalization, and will consider it a member of the same party family as the Danish 
Progress Party. 
 
The Radical Right Party Family 
I have now reviewed some of the most influential literature in the debate about the 
Radical Right Party family. I believe the literature suffers from too many arguments 
and conflicting perspectives. I trace that back to the deductive mode of research, which 
most political scientists employ in their discussions, in which they start out with a 
theoretical definition that they test against real-life cases. It would have been 
preferable to use an inductive approach, by studying the parties first, and look for 
common characteristics later (Mudde 1996, p244). 
 Despite this methodological critique, I find that the contributors convincingly 
reach the same conclusion, namely that RRPs are a distinct family of political parties. 
My selected cases are included in this family. To the extent that researchers employ 
further distinctions, they also categorize these cases as part of the same sub-category. 
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In sum, I do believe that my selected cases are sufficiently similar to be considered 
members of the same party family. As such, they are suitable objects for comparative 
analysis. 
 
Political Trust 
The concept of “political trust”, or rather its negative contrast “political distrust”, is an 
essential element of my analytical model (see figure 1.2). The concept has been a 
subject of a long debate in political science, which started in the 1960s. Despite, or 
perhaps because of the large amounts of research in this field, scientists have not 
agreed on a common approach or framework for analysis. “Political trust” remains an 
ambiguous concept that needs further clarification. The various terms used to connote 
the same concept, is testament to the lack of a coherent approach. “Support", 
"confidence", "satisfaction", "internal or external efficacy", "belief", and "affection", 
are typical examples of terms that are sometimes used as synonyms, and at other times 
have subtle differences. These terms are usually implicitly defined only, and when 
they are explicitly defined, the meaning varies from one researcher to another. 
 The ambiguity of terms makes it difficult to interpret my analytical model. For 
one thing, I have distinguished between system and elite distrust. A brief reading of 
the literature will indicate that this is not the only possible distinction. In fact, most 
scholars use a more sophisticated distinction with several “objects of trust”. Some also 
include the related concept of “efficacy” in their discussions of political trust. I have 
not yet defined the latter term, nor have I specified its relation to my model. 
 These considerations highlight my need to take a look at this important subject 
in political science research. I will begin with a look at some of the classical 
contributions before I start outlining my preferred approach. As will become evident in 
my discussion, there are some relevant methodological aspects to this debate as well. 
The question of how to measure political trust is specifically important. I will deal 
with that in chapter three, where I also intend to specify the methodological aspects of 
my own approach to the term “political trust”. 
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David Easton 
A significant part of the literature on political trust is either indirectly or directly based 
on David Easton's political theories18. He distinguishes between inputs to, and outputs 
from the political system. Inputs are either demands or support from citizens, while 
outputs are the actions and decisions of government (1965, pp. 29-33). This is a 
circular process where "the inputs provide what we may call the raw material on which 
the system acts so as to produce (…) outputs" (p31). These outputs, in turn, have an 
effect on the support and demands of citizens. From my perspective, "support" is the 
most interesting variable in Easton's model. It is the equivalent of “political trust”. 
Easton distinguishes between three different objects of support: the authorities, the 
regime, and the political community (p172). These are all part of the political system, 
or "black box" that creates outputs of inputs (see figure 2.1). Outputs will to a large 
extent determine citizens' level of political support (p267). 
 
Figure 2.1 Easton’s simplified model of a political system 
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political 
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Source: Easton 1965, p32 
 
Easton (1965) further distinguishes between diffuse and specific support. The 
latter is the direct effect of the fulfillment of demands (p268), while diffuse support is 
more of a "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or 
tolerate outputs to which they are opposed" (p273). In my model, diffuse support is the 
effect of political trust irrespective of issues or belief systems, that is, the direct effect 
of political trust. Specific support is explained by issues and belief-systems. Thus, it is 
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the indirect effect of the latter variable, through the trust-variables (see figure 1.2). In 
this sense, the word “specific” refers to the reason for a person’s trust or distrust. 
Diffuse trust has no such immediate explanation, but in the long run it can also be 
affected by outputs (Easton 1965, p273). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) criticize 
this distinction, with some justification in my view, for being too vague and unclear 
(pp. 12-13). 
 
William A. Gamson 
William A. Gamson (1968) makes use of Easton's ideas as a basis for developing his 
own theory of "Power and Discontent". This influential book is a common frame of 
reference in the literature about political trust19. Gamson starts with the broad concept 
of political alienation, which he argues, is the effect of a low level of both efficacy and 
political trust. Efficacy relates to Easton's input function, and "refers to people's 
perception of their ability to influence" the political system (p.42, my italics). 
"Political trust" depends on output, and on people's "perception of the necessity to 
influence" (ibid. my italics). 
According to Gamson, there are four objects of trust. They are (i) the incumbent 
authorities, (ii) the political institutions of a regime, (iii) the public philosophy of a 
regime, and (iv) the political community (1968, pp. 49-50). He considers these objects 
hierarchical, in the sense that the incumbent authority is the first object of trust, and 
the political community is the final object. Higher-level forms of distrust are more 
threatening to the political system, than distrust directed at the lowest level. Gamson 
also argues that distrust toward one level may over time lead to distrust directed at the 
next level (pp. 51-52). However, this is a theoretical claim, for which he does not 
provide any empirical evidence. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
18 This is based on my reading of the literature. The following are examples of direct reference: Gamson 1968, 
Miller 1974, and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995. Listhaug 2000 and Betz 1998 are examples of indirect 
“references”. 
19 See e.g. Miller 1974a and b, Miller and Listhaug 1990, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1996. 
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The Miller-Citrin Debate 
Arthur H. Miller and Jack Citrin set the tone for the debate about political trust, in their 
1974-exchange in the American Political Science Review. Their opposing views 
reflect an ongoing dispute within political science on this subject. Miller (1974a) 
started the debate with an article that appeared to confirm Gamson's theoretical claims. 
His data on the American public's attitudes toward their political system, from 1964 
until 1970, indicated that discontent had become more widespread. Voters in the 
United States were less trusting of their politicians and political institutions in 1970 
than they were in 1964. Political efficacy, as defined by Gamson, showed the same 
trend, and its correlation with political trust increased in the same time period20 
(1974b, p990). Hence, Miller’s data seemed to confirm Gamson's claim that trust and 
efficacy are two dimensions of the same phenomenon, namely “political alienation”. 
Based on the empirical findings, as well as on Gamson's theory, Miller claimed that 
there were serious reasons for concern. Discontent toward one level of the political 
system could move on to the next level. While referring to Gamson, Miller wrote: 
"further increases in alienation would presumably bring into question the very 
philosophy and goals of the political system, as well as the viability of the political 
community itself, and a 'desire for political separation may develop'" (1974a, p971). 
 In his response, Citrin ridiculed this dramatic conclusion. He argued that 
Miller’s measures of political trust were inadequate, in that they only measured 
support for incumbent political authorities (p974). Thus, the results merely served as a 
confirmation of the well-known fact that we do not trust those we disagree with 
(p973). Furthermore, Citrin argued that the American people were highly supportive 
and trusting of their system of government. He introduced new survey-evidence to 
support this argument (pp. 974-975). Thus, he exposed a lack of empirical evidence in 
Miller's research: the supposed link between trust of different levels of the government 
hierarchy. Miller was unable to prove Gamson’s assertion that distrust will eventually 
be directed toward higher and higher levels of government. 
 
                                              
20 From Pearson's r = .17 in 1964 to .35 in 1970. 
 42
Two levels 
Political scientists and theorists do not agree on what levels or “objects of trust” are 
relevant to this debate. Easton (1965) identifies three levels (p172), while Gamson 
(1968) expands those to four (pp. 49-50). Pippa Norris (1999) uses five levels of 
political trust in one of her more recent works. They are, (i) the political community, 
(ii) regime principles, (iii) regime performance, (iv) regime institutions, and (v) 
political actors (p10). Despite these various distinctions, it appears that the empirical 
debate between Miller and Citrin principally focused on two levels. That is, the 
incumbent political authorities on the one hand, and political institutions on the other. 
From a theoretical point of view, I believe Citrin rightly saw these two levels as 
fundamentally different. Political philosophers often separate the role of political elites 
from that of political institutions. De Toqueville is a case in point. He identified the 
danger of corrupt and tyrannical elected officials in his “Democracy in America”. 
Therefore, he argued that the role of political institutions was to limit the power of the 
elite, and thus, to organize democracy (1984, pp. 81-85). From this perspective, elites 
need not be trustworthy, but institutions certainly should be. Consequently, distrust 
directed at the political elite, need not lead to distrust of institutions, as Gamson and 
Miller argued. Quite the contrary, it could be rational to distrust the establishment 
while at the same time have confidence in political institutions.  
 This is of course a theoretical argument, and so far I have no empirical evidence 
to support it. However, I believe some evidence from public opinion research supports 
this interpretation. First of all, the distinction between two levels of trust is both 
fundamental and relatively easy to understand. I find it hard to believe that the bulk of 
democratic citizens are able to distinguish between Norris’ five levels of trust. I myself 
do not organize my thoughts on politics with such a fine-tuned distinction, nor do I 
believe other citizens do. In fact, public opinion research has shown that people 
simplify their thoughts about politics as much as possible. Converse’s (1964) famous 
article on the “Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” made that point very clear. 
As do other scientists who may not agree with Converse’s conclusions. They still 
concur that citizens use stereotypes and immediately accessible considerations when 
they express opinions about political objects (see e.g. Zaller 1992). That is why I 
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believe few people will consider more than two levels of political trust. A more 
sophisticated distinction will be too abstract, and thus, irrelevant to the way most 
people think about politics. 
 My second theoretical point was that Gamson and Miller might be wrong when 
they argue that distrust will gradually reach higher and higher levels of government. 
According to democratic political theory, it is rational to be supportive of political 
institutions, while distrusting political elites. Inglehart’s (1999) empirical evidence 
indicates that people do organize their thoughts in accordance with that argument. He 
finds that the populations of modern democratic societies are increasingly distrusting 
of authorities and political elites, while their support for the democratic system is on 
the rise. That is, increased distrust toward one level coincides with expanding support 
at a higher level. This is an opposite development from what one would expect from 
Miller and Gamson’s arguments. 
 In sum, the indications in this section point toward a two-level approach to 
political trust. It seems reasonable to argue that citizens think in terms of two levels of 
political trust, rather than the more complex distinctions offered by other scientists. 
Furthermore, most indications are that distrust toward the lowest level will not 
automatically lead to distrust at the next level. Still, there probably is some kind of 
connection between the two levels, which I will explore empirically in chapter four. 
 
Definition 
I will define “political trust” in accordance with my observations in the previous 
discussion. Webster's dictionary defines trust as an "assured reliance on the character, 
ability, strength, or truth of someone or something"; or "one in which confidence is 
placed". I consider it an adequate definition, but I would like to emphasize the 
"someone or something" that you can either trust or distrust. In the case of "political 
trust", they are obviously political objects. I will distinguish between objects at two 
different levels: the political elite on the one hand, and the political system and its 
institutions on the other. 
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Efficacy and Trust 
Scholars in the field of opinion research and political trust often choose to include the 
concept of “efficacy” in their discussions. The term comes from Gamson’s theory (see 
page 41). It refers to one’s perceived ability to influence political decisions21. Those 
with a low level of efficacy are also expected to be politically distrusting (Gamson 
1968, p42). In this sense, “efficacy” could have an effect on my analytical model. 
Should it be included as a separate variable from political trust, as is often done in 
literature in this field? 
 Gamson’s arguments in this respect come from Easton’s model of a political 
system (see figure 2.1). Efficacy relates to the input function, and political trust has to 
do with output (Gamson 1968, p42). Those who feel they are unable to influence 
political decisions will not support or trust the “decisions and actions” of government. 
Thus, efficacy serves as an explanation of political trust or distrust. Consequently, 
efficacy has an effect on political trust, not the other way around. If I were to include 
the efficacy-variable in my model, it would have to be placed prior to the trust-
variables in figure 1.2. I believe it could either have an intervening effect between 
“issues and belief-systems” and “political distrust”, or an independent effect on trust. It 
would not have a direct effect on my dependent variable22. So, the possibility of a 
separate efficacy-variable in my model will not change any of the connections that are 
the subject of my research. I will not include it in my model, as that would only 
complicate it to an unnecessary degree. 
 
Political Issues and Trust 
I have called the final variable in my analytical model “issues and belief systems”. The 
variable refers to the substantial political issues that make some voters chose a Radical 
Right Party on Election Day. People’s beliefs on issues are sometimes connected, so 
                                              
21 A person’s lack of efficacy could have two causes: either he or she feels that the system is unresponsive to 
people’s demands; or he or she feels personally incapable of influencing political decisions. This distinction has 
led some researchers to separate external efficacy (system responsiveness) from internal efficacy (personal 
capabilities) (see e.g. Lane 1959, pp. 148-149; Listhaug 1989, pp. 216-217). 
22 The feeling that you are unable to influence political decisions should not lead you to choose one political 
party over another. However, it could have an effect through “protest voting”, which is covered in my model.  
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that one specific policy-preference correlates with another on a different subject. These 
clusters of beliefs can be seen as “belief systems” (Oskamp 1991, p80). 
 The issues and belief-system variable obviously has a direct effect on voters’ 
party choice. But it could also have an indirect effect on RRP-support, through 
political distrust. Several scholars on political trust have argued that distrust correlates 
with certain political beliefs. Miller (1974a) was the first to conduct this kind of 
research. In his study of American electorates, he found that certain positions on 
political issues led to distrust. More specifically, those who disagreed with government 
policies were most distrusting. As government policies changed, those in favor of the 
new policy became more trusting, and those who preferred the previous policy 
changed from trust to distrust (pp. 955-961). Miller’s findings indicate that opposition-
voters are distrusting because they disagree with government policies. The distrust that 
he describes is what Easton referred to as a lack of “specific support”. Research into 
each of the countries I will study, indicate that there is such an effect. 
In Norway for instance, researchers seem to have found an effect of issues on 
trust in recent years. Aardal and Valen (1995) and Aardal et al (1999) have argued that 
people’s attitudes toward immigration have an effect on their expressions of trust or 
distrust. Their data further indicates that people’s attitudes toward a potential 
Norwegian EU-membership correlated with trust, but the correlation appears to have 
weakened (Aardal and Valen 1995, pp. 213-220; Aardal et al 1999, p182). In a similar 
fashion, Listhaug’s (2000) analysis revealed especially strong effects of "aid to 
underdeveloped countries" and "economic support for immigrants". Voters who 
wanted these expenditures reduced were the most distrusting (Listhaug 2000, pp. 10-
13). 
In their study of the 1994-Election in Denmark, Borre and Goul Andersen 
discovered an effect of “policy distance” on political trust. They found that on certain 
issues, people’s political beliefs correlated with their level of political trust. The 
clearest connections were found on issues such as immigration, welfare spending, and 
Denmark’s relation with the European Union. Those who disagreed with government 
policies had the lowest level of political trust (1997, pp. 306-309). 
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In Sweden, there appears to be a connection between people’s attitudes on 
taxation, and their trust in government. According to Jonas Edlund (1999), those who 
disapprove of the tax-system in Sweden are also the most distrusting (pp. 10-15). 
The evidence for Austria is somewhat more diffuse, due in part to a lack of 
public opinion research in that country. But there are some indications of a connection 
between issues and trust there as well. Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber (1992) argue 
that “issue voting” and political protest are increasing as part of the same general trend 
in Austria (pp. 30-31). Gabriel (1998) further argues that certain “value orientations” 
lead to political distrust in Austria. These values are measured by use of questions 
about issue-positions (pp. 366-370). Thus, there appears to be a connection between 
political issues and political trust in Austria as well. 
In all of the countries in my study, political distrust appears to correlate with 
people’s beliefs on certain issues. It is also notable that some of the issues with the 
greatest effect are also the favorite issues of the Radical Right, such as immigration, 
taxation, and welfare spending. This indicates that RRP-voters distrust politicians or 
political institutions because of their beliefs. Supporters of the Radical Right hold 
opinions that are contrary to established policies, and thus, they distrust the 
establishment. In this sense, there may be a spurious effect of “issues and belief 
systems” on both political distrust and RRP-support, as indicated in figure 1.2, on the 
next page. This effect, if it exists, relates to Eason’s concept of specific support; and it 
would indicate that RRP-voters are expressing “specific protest”, based on substantive 
policy positions. The alternative hypothesis is that there is no such effect, i.e. that these 
voters express “diffuse protest”. 
Easton’s (1965) distinction between specific and diffuse protest has led me to 
include the final variable in my model. By adding the concept of “issues and belief 
systems” to my analysis, I will be able to test these two competing hypotheses. 
Thereby, I hope to shed further light on the motivations of Radical Right Party 
supporters. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 A multivariate model of political protest 
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A Summary of My Model 
My main hypothesis is that some voters express political protest by voting for a 
Radical Right Party. I have defined “protest voting” as the expression of political 
distrust by voting for an RRP. Thus, I can test the hypothesis by looking at the 
relationship between distrust and RRP-support (see figure 1.2). 
Furthermore, I have introduced three additional hypotheses that will be part of 
my analysis. They led to an expanded analytical model, which I illustrated in figure 
1.2. In this chapter, I have discussed each of the four variables in the model. I found, 
first of all, that the dependent variable of “RRP-support” can be used in a comparative 
analysis. In the four countries I have selected, there is a coherent group of political 
parties on the Radical Right. Thus, it makes sense to compare voters of these parties in 
one country, with those of another. I have also discussed the concept of “political 
trust”, and I believe that a two-level approach to this term is appropriate. That is, I will 
distinguish between attitudes of trust or distrust toward the political system on the one 
hand, and toward the political elite on the other. Finally, I have found that the variable 
of “issues and belief systems” is relevant to my analysis. It may have a spurious effect 
on the other variables in my model, which I need to control for in the analysis. 
My next step is to form a methodological approach to these variables, that is, I 
have to decide how I will measure and test each part of my analytical model. I will do 
that in chapter three, in which I deal with data and methodology. Thus, I hope to 
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develop an appropriate empirical approach to the theoretical issues I have discussed in 
this chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
My theoretical discussion from chapter two will only be useful to my analysis if I am 
able to measure the theoretical concepts that I discussed there. In this chapter, I will 
provide an empirical framework that enables me to do just that. First, I will describe 
and briefly evaluate the available empirical data. Then, in the main part of this chapter, 
I will present my means of analyzing the data. In short, this chapter is about data and 
methodology. 
As I discuss and evaluate the choices I need to make in this chapter, I will 
invoke the following two concepts: reliability and validity. They are measures to 
evaluate the quality of my approach. Hellevik (1988, p120) defines “reliability” as the 
“degree to which data are free of random measurement errors”. Data should be 
collected in a systematic way, which precludes any errors. That will be the main 
evaluative criterion in my discussion of the data. “Validity”, according to Hellevik, is 
the “degree of correspondence between the theoretical meaning of a variable in the 
causal model and the measure used for the variable in the empirical analysis”. I will try 
to use empirical measures that capture the precise content of my operative variables. 
At least they should come as close as possible to that ideal. 
My goal in the analytical part of my dissertation is to test my analytical model, 
as portrayed in figure 1.2. The only realistic means of studying this individual-level 
model is by use of data from opinion surveys. I will not be able to collect new data; I 
will rely on existing surveys. Obviously, they were not designed to accommodate my 
research questions, but I still believe I will be able to find some relevant material. My 
influence over data-reliability in this situation is limited to my choice of existing data 
sets. Thus, my discussion of the data will be brief, and I will focus on describing the 
data. 
My hands are not as tied in terms of methodology. I will be able to select and 
manipulate variables in the available data sets, and to analyze them in my preferred 
fashion. The bulk of this chapter deals with how I shall do that; hence, I will focus 
most of my attention on data validity. In that discussion, I will look at each of the 
variables in my analytical model (figure 1.2). I will perform the most extensive 
discussion around the concept of “political trust”. Some empirical questions in this 
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respect remain unresolved from my discussion in chapter two. I will attempt to resolve 
those, and thus to fill inn the blanks in my approach to this concept. I will to do the 
same for the other variables in the model. Finally, in the last part of this chapter, I will 
discuss what statistical techniques should be used to study the relationship between the 
variables. 
 
Data 
My analysis may be limited by what data are available. The surveys were not designed 
to accommodate my needs; still, I believe my analytical model is no more ambitious 
than what the data permits. I am fortunate to have access to a large amount of 
extensive survey data, most of which comes from NSD23. It is a Norwegian state-
owned organization that gathers a wide variety of data from other sources, and makes 
it available for social scientists and students. In addition to the data from NSD, I also 
have access to five Austrian Exit Polls through the Extreme Right Party Project’s 
database. 
 
The World Values Survey 
The World Values survey (WVS) of 1990 is the only comparative data set I have 
access to that includes all of the four countries in my study. Since I intend to analyze 
these countries as a group, I would have preferred to have more surveys of this nature. 
But the 1990 WVS is the only survey that allows such direct comparison. I also have 
access to the 1996 WVS, but that only covers two of the countries I intend to study, 
namely Norway and Sweden. I will use that data set in the present chapter, as a part of 
my discussion of political trust, and various facets of that concept. 
 The World Values Surveys are the products of large comparative research-
projects on values and political change in more than 65 societies around the world24. It 
includes questions about voting, political trust, values, political issues, and social 
                                              
23 The Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) have anonymized the data sets from the Norwegian 
Electoral surveys. Bernt Aardal and Henry Valen were the Principal Investigators of these surveys and Statistics 
Norway collected the data. Neither the principal Investigators, Statistics Norway, nor the Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services are responsible for the analyses and interpretation of data presented here. 
24 The World Values Survey homepage at http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/index.html 
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background. A respected research institution in each country conducted the polls, 
under the leadership of a social scientist. These scientists and several others have used 
the data in over 300 publications. In sum, these are some of the most trusted and oft-
used available survey data in the world of social science. I have no reason to question 
this reputation; and I will consider the data to be sufficiently reliable for my purpose. 
 
National Surveys 
A single comparative data set is not enough to perform a thorough analysis of my 
research questions. I will also apply national data sets from each of the four countries. 
The available survey data from Austria, Norway, and Denmark has the advantage of 
being longitudinal, which means that the same questions have been asked repeatedly, 
usually in connection with elections. This enables me to study how attitudes change 
over time. I do not need this kind of data from Sweden, since New Democracy only 
gained enough support in one election in that country, for it to be represented in 
Parliament. I have access to the Swedish Election Survey of 1991, which includes a 
substantial number of New Democracy supporters. 
 The Extreme Right Party Project has made five Austrian Exit Polls available for 
its researchers. The data comes from the Austrian polling firm Fessel, which made one 
poll for each parliamentary election in Austria since 1986. They asked questions about 
actual voting, social background and the reason for people’s choice of political party. 
They did not include attitude-questions or questions about political trust. Therefore, I 
will use a different methodology when I analyze the Austrian data, as opposed to all 
the others. I will deal with that methodology later in this chapter. My only means of 
testing the Austrian data’s reliability is to test its accuracy in predicting election 
results. It has been remarkably accurate25, and thus, I consider the data to be reliable. 
 NSD has provided me with the data from the Norwegian election surveys from 
1977 to 1997. There is one data set for every parliamentary election, which adds up to 
six data sets. I will only use four of those, since I have limited my analysis to a certain 
timeframe. The surveys come from the Norwegian Electoral Program, headed by Bernt 
                                              
25 The largest differences between the actual result of one of the three major parties, and the predicted results are 
.5 percent in 1986, .2 percent in 1990, .7 percent in 1994, .5 percent in 1995, and .3 percent in 1999. 
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Aardal and Henry Valen. They conducted the research at the time of each of these 
elections. They used questions about numerous political issues, political trust, actual 
voting, social background etc. The surveys are part of a long research tradition in 
Norway, starting with the election survey of 1957. The data has been used in several 
publications, and is well respected. I have no reason to question its reliability. 
I have also gained access to as many as eleven Danish election surveys, through 
NSD. They include every parliamentary election that the Progress Party and the 
Danish People’s Party have participated in, from 1973 to 1998. Again, I have a more 
limited timeframe that that, so I will only use some of the more recent surveys, but I 
will also take a look at 1973, which is an interesting year for the Progress Party. The 
number of questions and types of questions vary to a greater degree in the Danish 
surveys than in the Norwegian ones. However, Danish social scientists have dealt 
extensively with the issue of political trust, and so the surveys include several 
questions that are relevant in that respect. That makes them useful for my analysis. I 
believe the long research tradition on political trust in Denmark makes the data 
sufficiently reliable for my research. But I have no other means of evaluating 
reliability. 
 Finally, I will use the Swedish Election Survey of 1991. It is the only extensive 
survey that includes a substantial number of New Democracy voters. However, one 
survey is not enough to perform a thorough analysis of New Democracy voters as 
such. That would require more extensive time-series data. Thus, my analysis of New 
Democracy only makes sense in a comparative perspective, that is, as a member of the 
Radical Right Party family. The Swedish survey includes questions about political 
trust, social background, political issues, and assessments of individual politicians. It is 
part of a research tradition in Sweden, similar to that of the other two Scandinavian 
countries. Again, I will have to assume a fair degree of reliability. I have no evidence 
or indications to the contrary. 
 Having identified the available data, I now turn to the question of how I will use 
the data for my purpose. In the remaining part of this chapter I will focus on 
methodology. 
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Methodology 
In this section, I will determine how to measure and test each part of my analytical 
model, as outlined in figure 1.2. I will use validity as an evaluative criterion to discuss 
and assess the accuracy and usefulness of my approach. My model includes four 
variables; I have discussed relevant theoretical aspects of each in the previous chapter. 
I will now in a similar fashion discuss how to measure and test each of the variables. I 
also need to determine what analytical tools I should use to study the relationship 
between the variables. I see that as mainly a choice between least squares regression 
analysis and logistic regression. I will determine which technique is more useful for 
my purpose. Finally, I will look at the Austrian Exit Polls, and try to come up with an 
approach to analyze that data. 
 
Radical Right Party Support 
I will start with my dependent variable: support for a Radical Right Party. There are 
two ways to measure that. First, you may ask a question like the one from the world 
Values Surveys: “If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party (…) 
would you vote?” I consider this to be a measure of voting intention. Secondly, you 
can measure actual voting, that is, to ask what respondents voted in the previous 
election. The election surveys, and the Austrian Exit Polls, use these kinds of 
questions, and some use both. 
 I believe there are advantages and disadvantages to both these measures. 
Questions about voting intention do not depend on memory; rather they serve as 
expressions of current feelings and attitudes. As such, they probably correspond with 
other attitude questions that measure current feelings and opinions. However, 
answering a question about voting intention does not entail the same commitment as 
actual voting. Voting intensions are more influenced by current events and whatever 
the respondent has at “the top of his head” (Zaller 1992, p48), than actual voting is. In 
this sense, measuring actual voting has some advantages both in terms of commitment, 
and because it is an expression of actual behavior. The main problem in measuring 
actual voting is the respondents’ faulty memories. This becomes an increasing problem 
as time passes since the election. Therefore, the Austrian Exit Polls have a special 
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advantage, in that the questions were asked literally minutes after the respondents 
voted. The same can be said for the other national surveys that were conducted within 
a brief time-span after the elections. 
Based on these observations, I believe I should use measures of voting intention 
in surveys that are not directly linked to an actual election. In the election surveys and 
exit polls, actual voting seems to be a better alternative. Thus, I avoid some of the 
problems of memory loss, and I am able to measure current attitudes. I will use voting 
intention for a RRP as the dependent variable in my analysis of the World Values 
Survey data, and memory of actual voting in the national surveys. Thus, I believe I 
have found a valid measure of Radical Right Party support in each of the surveys. 
 
Political Trust 
I argued in chapter two that political trust should be measured at two different levels, 
according to the object of trust or distrust. First, there is trust directed at the political 
elite; and then at a higher level: trust of the political system. I will now add some 
methodological points to my discussion of this concept. When I have completed my 
discussion, I hope to have developed an overall approach that will be useful to my 
analysis. 
There are a number of different survey questions that can be interpreted as 
measures of political trust. Some ask about confidence in political parties, others ask 
whether politicians can be trusted, and still others question whether the respondent 
supports the democratic political system. With all these survey-questions at hand, it is 
important to find out how respondents interpret and respond to different questions. 
John Zaller’s (1992) theory about the “Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion” is useful 
in that respect. He parsimoniously presents his theory as four “axioms”, through which 
he attempts to answer two questions: “how citizens learn about matters that are for the 
most part beyond their immediate experience, and how they convert the information 
they acquire into opinions” (p40). The latter question is relevant to my methodological 
discussion. Zaller answers it by stating the following two axioms: 
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A3. Accessibility Axiom. The more recently a consideration has been called to 
mind or thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related 
considerations from memory and bring them to the top of the head for use (p48). 
A4. Response Axiom. Individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the 
considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them (p 49). 
 
These axioms indicate that it is difficult to get meaningful answers on questions that 
people do not think about in their everyday lives. That is not surprising. Most pollsters 
would agree that you should not believe poll-results concerning some distant foreign 
policy question or other complex issues that are not covered by the media and are not 
part of public debate. These observations relate to my previous discussion of political 
trust. In that discussion, my main focus was on different objects of trust. I assume that 
the frequency of people’s thoughts about these objects varies. That is, most citizens 
probably do not think as much about institutions and principles, as they do about 
individual politicians, for instance. The objects that they think about frequently will be 
easily accessible for consideration in a survey interview. Others may be more difficult, 
or even impossible to evaluate under the constraints of a short interview over the 
phone. In that case, a respondent may interpret the question to be simpler than it 
actually is, by substituting one object with another that is more easily accessible in the 
person’s mind. For example, a question about the institution of the Supreme Court 
may be interpreted as a question about judges in general. Such simplifications are 
common, and well known in opinion research. In my case, they indicate that I need to 
look more closely at how people answer questions about political trust.  
 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (1995) looked at that question in 
their analysis of public attitudes toward the US Congress. They found that "when 
people are asked what they think of Congress, with no additional information (as is 
usually the case with such questions), the answer given is very much an evaluation of 
the membership of Congress, not of the institution” (p107). In general terms, Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse argue that when respondents are asked about political institutions, 
they think about the people in those institutions (p44). Zaller’s theory can be used to 
explain this phenomenon. In his terms: the abstract idea of an institution qua institution 
is not immediately salient or accessible to a respondent. Rather, he or she “simplifies” 
by thinking about people in those institutions, which in most cases means politicians or 
bureaucrats. By specifying the referent in a long introduction to some of their 
 56
questions, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse were able to measure attitudes toward the 
institutions themselves. The introduction read as follows: 
 
Now, I’ve asked you to rate some people in government, but sometimes when we 
talk about parts of the government in Washington, like the Supreme Court, the 
presidency, and the Congress, we don’t mean the people currently serving in office, 
we mean the institutions themselves, no matter who’s in office. These institutions 
have their own buildings, historical traditions and purposes laid out in the 
Constitution. I’d like to know how warm or cold you feel toward these institutions, 
not the people currently in office (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, p44). 
 
The answers to these questions were radically different from the answers to the 
“ordinary” questions about trust in institutions. People were more supportive of the 
institutions themselves than the people in those institutions (p45). Findings like these 
are usually not taken into account in the literature on political trust. I believe that has 
led to some overly dramatic conclusions. Researchers who observe a high degree of 
distrust in response to questions about political institutions often argue that the 
institutions themselves lack support. They see this as evidence of a potential threat to 
the democratic political system (see e.g. Miller 1974a). That is not how Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse see these questions; rather they argue that questions about institutions 
should be interpreted as being about the political elite. 
 In order to specify how I should interpret different questions about political 
trust in my analysis; I will perform a factor analysis of some of the empirical material. 
I believe that analysis will enable me to find valid measures of political trust. The 
World Values Survey of 1996 is useful in that respect, because it includes quite a few 
questions about political trust; more than in the 1990 WVS. The factor analysis will 
indicate how the more limited set of questions from 1990 should be interpreted. It will 
also be useful in my selection of trust-questions from the other data sets, in the sense 
that it will indicate how various types of questions should be interpreted. 
Unfortunately, the 1996 WVS only covers Norway and Sweden of the four 
countries I intend to study. I will have to assume that my findings in these two 
countries are valid in Denmark and Austria as well. If I get radically different results in 
Norway and Sweden, I cannot make that assumption. However, if I observe the same 
trend in the two countries, then that will be an indication that my findings are part of a 
general pattern in countries that are similar to Norway and Sweden. As I have 
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previously discussed, I believe that the four countries in my analysis are sufficiently 
similar for the type of analysis I intend to do. 
I have selected seven questions or variables from the 1996 World Values 
Survey that I will use in the factor analysis. The first question lets the respondent 
choose between different directions that the development of society may take; one of 
which is: “the entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by 
revolutionary action”. That sounds like a negative attitude toward the current 
organization of society, including the political system. I have made that variable into a 
dummy variable. The second and third questions compare the current democratic 
political systems with other alternatives. They appear to be measures of “system-
trust”, as well. In the fourth question, the respondent shall indicate whether he or she 
has confidence in the political parties. The fifth and sixth questions are about 
confidence in Parliament and the Civil Service, respectively. My previous discussion 
indicates that these questions could measure trust in the political elite, not in 
institutions. Finally, in the seventh question respondent shall indicate whether he or 
she is satisfied “with the way the people now in national office are handling the 
country's affairs”. It measures satisfaction with incumbent office-holders. I have coded 
all questions, except the first, on a scale from one to four. 
I will use “Kaiser’s criterion” to select factors, and “oblimin rotation” to rotate 
the factors. The latter choice stems from my belief that any factors extracted from the 
data will be correlated in some way, this in accordance with figure 1.2. The analysis 
reveals two factors in both the Norwegian and Swedish data, as presented in table 3.1. 
I will make several points based on the evidence in the table. The most 
important of these is that the analysis confirms my argument from chapter two. That is, 
the concept of political trust has two different components: one relates to the political 
system, the other to incumbent political elites. There is hardly any variation between 
Norway and Sweden in this respect, in the sense that the same factors load clearly on 
the same variables in both countries. On that basis, I will assume that these findings 
are valid for Austria and Denmark as well. 
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Table 3.1 Factor analysis of seven trust-questions that reveals a 
system-factor and an elite-factor in Norway and Sweden. Factor 
loadings 
 Norway Sweden 
 System Elite System Elite 
Revolutionary change .33 .08 .41 .08 
Democracy: good .82 .01 .80 .03 
Democracy: better .86 -.13 .89 -.12 
Confidence: Parties -.04 .74 -.03 .85 
Confidence: Parliament .04 .77 -.01 .89 
Confidence: Civil service -.05 .67 .05 .81 
Incumbent satisfaction .05 .54 .01 .63 
Correlation between factors .21 .35 
 “Don’t know”-answers are excluded from the analysis. 
Method: Oblimin rotation, “Kaiser’s criteria”. 
Questions and coding: 
Revolutionary change: “On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live 
in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. (1) The entire way our society is 
organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action; (2) Our society must be gradually 
improved by reforms; (3) Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive 
forces. (1) is coded as 1, all others as 0. 
Democracy good: “I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think 
about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly 
good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system”. 
Coded on a scale from 1 (=very good) to 4 (=very bad). 
Democracy better: “I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic 
political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, 
after I read each one of them? Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of 
government.” Coded on a scale from 1 (=agree strongly) to 4 (=disagree strongly). 
Confidence: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very 
much confidence or none at all? Political parties; parliament; the civil service.” Coded on a scale 
from 1 (=a great deal) to 4 (=none). 
Incumbent satisfaction: “How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are 
handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?” Coded on a scale from 1 (=very satisfied) to 4 (=very dissatisfied). 
Source: World Value Survey 1996. N=1310 for Sweden, 1451 for Norway. 
 
The system-aspect of political trust has to do with the current political system, 
that is, the way our democratic political system is organized. I believe the questions 
used by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse to measure trust in institutions, as institutions, 
would correlate with this factor. Their variables, as well as the ones I use, measure the 
highest level of political trust, which is not directly related to the people who run the 
system. Rather, they deal with the system itself. In western democratic countries, few 
people are against the way the system is organized. Therefore, scientists and pollsters 
have found that these kinds of questions provide such a limited amount of variance 
that they are not interesting in terms of analysis. That makes it difficult to find data 
sets that include this type of variable. Fortunately for my analysis, the “revolutionary 
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change”-variable is part of the 1990 World Values Survey. It has the weakest loading 
with the system-factor, probably because it deals with society in general, and not just 
the political system. Still, I will use it as a measure of system trust or distrust in my 
analysis of the 1990 WVS. 
 The elite factor loads strongly on four variables, the first of which is confidence 
in political parties. This is a little surprising. Some experts on political parties argue 
that the parties have become parts of the political system itself (see e.g. Katz and Mair 
1995). Ignazi (1992) makes that assumption when he argues that anti-system parties 
are against all other parties. In his interpretation, negative attitudes toward political 
parties are also anti-system attitudes. The data in table 3.1 indicates that the public 
does not see political parties that way. Rather they evaluate political parties by the 
same standard as political elites. Thus, they see parties as actors in a political system, 
not as part of the system itself. That may not be an accurate assessment, but 
apparently, that is how most people see it. 
 The other three questions that the elite-factor loads strongly on are, first of all, 
two questions about political institutions, namely Parliament and the Civil Service. It 
also loads on the question about incumbent authorities. I find it interesting that the 
same factor loads so strongly on these three questions. It indicates that people evaluate 
these objects similarly. That can only mean that when they are asked about their view 
of political institutions, they answer as if the question related to current office-
holders26. That is, people interpret questions about political institutions as if they 
related to the people in those institutions. Thus, my evidence supports Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse’s assertions in this respect. Their findings appear not only to be valid in 
the United States, but also in the countries in my study. 
 Finally, table 3.1 offers support for my expectation that system and elite trust 
are somehow connected. The data indicates that the two factors are positively 
correlated. I will explore this connection in greater detail in chapter four. 
 I will use this empirical evidence as a basis for my selection of variables to 
measure political trust. First of all, I will use evaluative questions about the democratic 
                                              
26 There is another possible interpretation and that is that when people are asked about incumbent office-holders, 
they think in terms of the institutions or offices they hold. That is not likely, since it would be a more abstract 
interpretation than what the question actually warrants. 
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political system and questions about the need for radical changes in the system, as 
measures of “system trust”. It may be difficult to find these kinds of variables, but I 
have already identified one useful question from the 1990 World Values Survey. 
Furthermore, I will use questions about political institutions, without a more specific 
referent, as measures of “elite trust”. That may not be an accurate interpretation based 
on the literal wording of the questions, but it is the right choice in terms of how people 
answer these questions. Questions about political parties in general should also be 
counted in this category, as should direct questions about elites. 
I can now safely conclude that political trust is a concept that should be 
measured at two different levels. In this section, I have determined what types of 
questions should be used to measure both system and elite trust. In doing that, I have 
tried to fill in the blanks from my theoretical discussion of this concept. Thus, I believe 
I have developed an approach to “political trust” that is both theoretically coherent and 
empirically valid. 
 
Issues and Belief Systems 
In the previous chapter, I argued that there may be a spurious effect of “issues and 
belief systems”, on the other variables in figure 1.2. The issues-variable may partially 
or wholly explain the apparent effect of political distrust on RRP-support. In this 
section, I will try to determine how best to measure that variable. 
Because there is no one variable that measure “issues and belief systems” as 
such, I will use a group of variables that capture more than one issue, in addition to 
some kind of a belief system. It is tempting to include as many variables as possible, 
and thus to control for every measurable issue. I will try to resist this temptation. It 
would make my results difficult to interpret, and open up for the possibility of 
unforeseen effects and inexplicable results. Furthermore, from a statistical point of 
view, the strategy of including large numbers of variables has some problems. In a 
worst-case scenario it can lead to false results and invalid interpretations. At the very 
least it is a strategy that forces results from the data that are not justified (Rubin 1997). 
Hence, I will select a limited number of variables that measure relevant issues in terms 
of RRP-support and political trust. 
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 As I indicated in chapter two, it appears that some of the favorite issues of the 
Radical Right also have an effect on political trust. In order to select issue-variables, I 
will start by categorizing them as either “new politics” or “old politics” issues. These 
terms are hard to define, yet useful as an analytical distinction between different types 
of issues. Ronald Inglehart (1990) is frequently associated with these terms. He argues 
that in the late 1960s and 1970s, a new generation emerged that had experienced 
economic security their entire lives. Because of this relative security, they were more 
interested in social and quality-of-life issues, than traditional economic issues. This 
generation, which came of age in the 1960s, demanded more environmental protection, 
social freedom, and a higher quality of life. Their political agenda met some 
opposition from what Kitschelt (1997) calls the New Right. The conflict between these 
two groups, which are now often referred to as New Left and New Right, focused 
more on social issues than on traditional economic issues. I will consider the typical 
issues that the New Right and the New Left disagree over to be "new politics" issues. 
Immigration, environmental protection, and law and order are typical points of dispute. 
These issues are distinguishable from "old politics" issues that are related to the 
traditional economic cleavage between left and right. Disputes over private versus 
public ownership of business, taxes, and welfare spending are cases in point. 
 Radical Right Parties probably gain support based on both new and old politics 
issues. However, as I look at the literature on these parties, I find that it particularly 
emphasizes “new politics” issues (see e.g. Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; 
Hainsworth 2000; Kitschelt 1997). Therefore, I will always include at least one such 
issue in my analysis. I will also try to use an “old politics” issue whenever possible. 
Questions about taxation seem particularly relevant to the success of RRPs. The exact 
variables that I choose will be dependent on the individual data sets. I will make those 
decisions as I go along with my analysis. 
 In addition to three or four issue-variables, I need a measure of a more general 
“belief system”. A question from the World Values Survey seems to fulfill that need: 
“in political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place 
your views on this scale, generally speaking?” Then, the respondent picks a number 
from 1 (left) to 10 (right). It is difficult to judge exactly what kind of reasoning 
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individual respondents use to pick a number on that scale. Some might emphasize new 
politics issues, others old politics. This ambiguity has some advantages for my 
analysis. The subjectivity of this scale means that it measures any kind of belief 
system that the respondent uses in his or her thinking about politics. Thus, it seems 
likely that it affects voting, which is exactly what I am looking for in these variables. 
Most of the data sets I have access to include this variable, with some variation in how 
they phrase the question. I will use these as measures of the general belief systems of 
voters. 
 In sum, I will use four or five variables as measures of “issues and belief 
systems”. I find it particularly important to include one or two “new politics” issues 
and I will always use the left-right self-placement scale. I am not interested in the 
individual effects of these variables. Rather, I will include these variables as a block in 
my model to test for its possible spurious effects. 
 
Statistical Techniques 
I have now identified how I will measure the different variables in my analytical 
model. I will proceed to discuss the possible statistical techniques I can use to measure 
and explore the relationships between the variables. I need to make several choices in 
that respect. Thus, I will conduct somewhat of a statistical discussion in the following 
section of this chapter. 
 I will start my analysis of the empirical data by exploring the relationships 
between two variables at the time. In order to do that, I will use simple frequency 
distributions, cross-tabulations and the correlation measure Pearson’s r. Since these 
techniques are well known and not controversial, I do not find it necessary to discuss 
them in any detail. However, when it comes to the multivariate analysis, in which I 
will employ the entire analytical model, I have to choose between at least two 
statistical techniques. These means of analysis have different purposes and functions. 
To evaluate their usefulness for my purpose, I will briefly sum up the type of analysis I 
intend to do, and what types of results I want to get from the technique. 
My goal in the analysis of the survey data is to determine the effects of three 
independent variables on the dependent variable (see figure 1.2). I am especially 
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interested in determining if there are some effects that are equivalent “protest voting”, 
as previously defined (see page 7). In Hellevik’s terminology, I will do a “causal 
analysis”. It should be distinguished from “prediction analysis”, the purpose of which 
is to predict values on the dependent variable, based on different combinations of 
independent variables (Hellevik 1988, p152). 
In order to perform the type of causal analysis I have outlined in figure 1.2; I 
need to do a so-called “sequential analysis” (Tabachnick and Fidel 1996, pp. 149, 
591). I will start by looking at the relationships between the two trust-variables and the 
dependent variable, and then proceed to include a group of issue-variables. I am not 
that interested in studying the effects of individual issue-variables on RRP-support. 
Rather, I hope to study changes in the effects of other variables, and in the explained 
variance of the overall model, when I include the last group of variables. This type of 
analysis will enable me to answer some of my research questions. For instance, if the 
effects of the trust variables disappear with the inclusion of “issues and belief 
systems”, it will give credence to the “specific distrust” hypothesis. But if the 
explained variance of the model increases dramatically when I include the latter 
variables, it indicates that protest is at best a peripheral motivation for RRP-supporters. 
I believe the most relevant statistical techniques for my purpose, are least 
squares regression and logistic regression. Barbara G. Tabachnick and Linda S. Fidell 
(1996) offer short and to-the-point descriptions of the goals of these types of analysis: 
 
The primary goal of regression analysis is usually to investigate the relationship 
between a DV [dependent variable] and several IVs [independent variables]. As a 
preliminary step, one determines how strong the relationship is between DV and 
IVs; then, with some ambiguity, one assesses the importance of each of the IVs to 
the relationship (p128). 
 The goal of [logistic regression] analysis is to correctly predict category of 
outcome for individual cases. The first step is to establish that there is a 
relationship between the outcome and the set of predictors. If a relationship is 
found, one usually tries to simplify the model by eliminating some predictors while 
still maintaining strong prediction. Once a reduced set of predictors is found, the 
equation can be used to predict outcomes for new cases on a probabilistic basis 
(p576). 
 
In terms of the main purpose of these techniques, regression analysis appears as the 
best choice for my analytical strategy. Its main goal is to identify relationships 
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between variables, which is what I intend to do. Logistic regression also involves 
discovering relationships, but that is only a partial goal of that technique. 
However, there are some advantages to logistic regression that are relevant to 
my research. First of all, it is a technique that is well suited for dichotomous dependent 
variables. Regression analysis is mainly fit to handle continuous dependent variables. 
One of the assumptions of regression analysis is that the errors from the linear model 
should be normally distributed. The variance of these errors should also be equal over 
the entire data-range (Lewis-Beck 1980, p26). None of these assumptions are met 
when the dependent variable is dichotomous. Still, Fox (1997) argues that these 
assumptions are not critical to a least-squares analysis, as long as the sample-size is 
sufficiently large (p441). I consider my data to have sufficiently large samples, as they 
all have well over a thousand respondents. Hence, these problems are not essential to 
my analysis. 
However, Fox argues that there is a further problem with linear regression, 
which is more serious and difficult to solve. Regression analyses with dichotomous 
DVs may lead to predictions that are higher than 1 and lower than 0, which should be 
impossible. The more complex logistic function prevents that possibility (Fox 1997, 
p441; Helland 1999, p36). Accordingly, most prediction analyses with several 
independent variables and dichotomous dependent variables should be conducted with 
logistic regression. These facets have made logistic regression a popular tool in the 
medical sciences. But these arguments are not valid for my research. I intend to do a 
causal analysis; I am not interested in predicting results. Hence, I do not have to worry 
about wrong predictions. 
 Both least squares regression and logistic regression are well suited for 
conducting sequential analyses. The same principles apply in both cases, in that the 
researcher starts with some variables, and then adds one or several groups of additional 
variables. The purposes of the analysis is to see how the effect of the initial variables 
change with the inclusion of additional variables, and to see how the effect of the 
model as a whole changes. For the first purpose, I will perform a so-called causal 
decomposition. I will start out with a bivariate model, and continue to “decompose” 
that effect into spurious, indirect and direct effects. The various effects that I find 
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through regression analysis will “add up”; that is, I will have accounted for the entire 
bivariate effect when I decompose it into other effects. In a logistic analysis, the 
effects do not necessarily add up, which indicates that the decomposition is imprecise 
(Hellevik 1988, p187). Hence, linear regression seems a better choice for causal 
decomposition, though I do not mean to suggest that logistic regression is 
fundamentally flawed in this respect. 
 The second purpose of sequential analysis is to study the changed effect of the 
model as a whole, when one includes additional groups of variables. That effect is 
measured by “explained variance” or “goodness-of-fit” measures. The most common 
tool in regression analysis is R2. It is a standardized measure, which varies between 0 
(no effect) and 1 (perfect fit). In logistic regression, there are some similarly 
standardized tools available. But Helland (1999) argues that they are not entirely 
reliable, and should be avoided (pp. 30-33). That leaves only one reliable tool for this 
type of analysis, namely “log-likelihood”. It is useful for my analysis because it gives 
an indication of changes in the goodness-of-fit of the logistic function. However, it is 
unstandardized, which makes the findings difficult to interpret in terms of substantial 
results. “Log-likelihood” does reveal whether the sequential inclusion of variables 
leads to a significant increase in explanatory power, but it is difficult to make a 
determination as to the “amount” of change.  Furthermore, it is easy to achieve 
significance with several variables in a large data set, so that information in itself is not 
really interesting. 
 In sum, even though logistic regression is suitable for analyses with 
dichotomous dependent variables, I find least squares regression to be the most useful 
for my purpose. The oft-used arguments in favor of logistic regression do not 
invalidate the use of ordinary regression in my case. Furthermore, least squares 
regression offers measures that are straightforward and easy to interpret substantially. 
That does not mean that I could not use logistic regression in my analysis, but I prefer 
the simpler method as long as it provides statistically valid results. 
The next step is to determine what types of correlation coefficients I should use 
to interpret the regression-results. The standardized beta-coefficient is useful when one 
compares the effects of different variables in the same data set and in the same 
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analysis. I need that measure to compare, for instance, the effects of system distrust 
and elite distrust on my dependent variable. However, this measure should not be used 
to compare effects across samples, which I hope to do in my comparative analysis of 
the 1990 World Values Survey. The beta-coefficient may change simply because the 
variance of the variables is different in various data sets. Hence, if one effect is the 
same in two data sets, the beta weight may still be different if the variable varies more 
in one data set than in the other (Lewis-Beck 1980, p65). In fact, this problem may 
also occur when one tries to compare R2 in different data sets, since that measure also 
depends on the amount of variance. I will deal with this problem by including the 
standard deviation of the variables in the tables where I present my results. If there are 
only minor differences between data sets, I can compare the standardized measures 
without hesitation. But if there are some notable differences, I will not make that 
comparison. Note that this argument is only valid for my analysis of the 1990 WVS. 
The other data sets consist of different questions or variables that cannot be directly 
compared with any statistical technique. Nevertheless, I will include the standard 
deviation of the variables in these tables as well. That will enable the interested reader 
to calculate the unstandardized regression coefficients from the standardized ones27. 
Some statisticians prefer unstandardized coefficients, and argue that they are the only 
valid basis for statistical inference. My approach enables these readers to see if they 
reach the same conclusions as I do, by looking at unstandardized coefficients.  
 I have now looked at my available options in terms of statistical techniques, and 
I have decided to use least squares regression to perform the multivariate analysis. 
Furthermore, I will use R2 and standardized regression coefficients as measures of 
effects and explained variance. I had several options, but made my choices on the basis 
of the type of analysis I intend to do, and with the hope that the techniques will 
provide intelligible results. I also aim to provide enough information for the reader to 
be able to criticize my approach. That is an important ideal in any data analysis, which 
I hope to fulfill. 
 
                                              
27 The unstandardized coefficients can be calculated by use of the following formula: standardized coefficient * 
(standard deviation of the dependent variable) / (standard deviation of the independent variable) 
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The Austrian Exit Polls 
The Fessel polling firm conducted the Austrian Exit Polls, mainly as a means of 
predicting election results. The polls consist of a limited number of questions, and 
there are no variables that can serve as the independent variables in my model, as I 
have defined them in this chapter. Consequently, I have to use a different methodology 
when I analyze these data. 
There are only two questions in the Austrian Exit Polls that are of interest to my 
analysis. The English translations of these questions are phrased as follows: “What 
was the main reason for you voting for the FPÖ?” and, “what was truly decisive in 
your vote for the FPÖ?” Both were open questions that have been coded into a limited 
number of categories in the data sets. I do not find the distinction between “the main 
reason” and “the truly decisive” reason for party choice to be of any analytical value in 
my case. Thus, I have merged these two variables into one. I have also classified the 
original categories into six broader categories. They are “protest against the elite”, 
“issues and belief systems”, “opposition vote”, “personal vote”, “likes the FPÖ”, and a 
residual category. I have displayed the basis of these categories in table A.1 in the 
appendix. 
 These categories or variables measure the motivations of FPÖ voters. As such, 
they are highly relevant for my main research question. In the previous parts of this 
chapter I have developed a strategy for statistically measuring these motivations. The 
Austrian Exit Polls measure the same thing in a more direct fashion. Therefore, I 
should be able to reach the same type of conclusions by simply studying the 
distribution of answers to these questions. I will also study the relationship between 
different types of answers. Poll-respondents could give an unlimited number of 
answers to these questions, so each respondent can be counted with an answer in 
several of these categories. That enables me to look for connections between various 
types of answers. For instance, I can find out if those who answer “protest” also 
mention other reasons. In sum, the Austrian Exit Polls require a different methodology 
than the other surveys I have access to, but they are just as useful to my research. 
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Summary 
I have tried to outline an empirical approach for analysis in this chapter. That is, I 
started with a description of the available data, and continued with a description of 
how I will use the data. I have determined how to measure each part of my analytical 
model, and I have discussed and reached a conclusion on my preferred statistical 
technique. I have also discussed how to analyze the Austrian Exit Polls, which 
deviates somewhat from the other data. Having resolved these questions, I now have 
both a theoretical and an empirical framework for analysis. That enables me to delve 
into the actual empirical research, which will be the purpose of chapter four. 
 
 69
CHAPTER FOUR: AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PROTEST 
I will now turn to the empirical analysis of political protest and protest voting. In doing 
so, I will use the theoretical and empirical frameworks for analysis I developed in the 
previous chapters. That ought to be a solid basis on which to perform the statistical 
analysis. 
I intend to focus squarely on the data-analysis in this chapter. I will comment 
on my results as throughout the analysis, but I reserve a more elaborate discussion of 
some implications of my findings for chapter five. In the present chapter, I will start 
out with the simplest model of protest voting, as discussed on page 6, and illustrated in 
figure 1.1. The model indicates that political protest is the expression of political 
distrust by voting for a Radical Right Party. I will measure protest by looking at the 
bivariate relationship between distrust and support for these parties. I will then move 
towards a more complex model of protest voting by adding additional variables until I 
get to the final analysis of figure 1.2. In the last part of this chapter, I will perform 
some additional analyses to further explore and pursue my findings.  
 
The Bivariate Model 
The main purpose of my dissertation is to explore the relationship between political 
distrust and Radical Right Party support. The academic literature on these parties 
usually states that there is a positive relationship between the two variables as 
indicated by figure 1.1. I have used this statement as the basis for my main hypothesis, 
which is that RRP-voters are motivated by political distrust; i.e. they are "protest 
voters", according to my definition of the term (see page 7). For the sake of clarity, I 
include the figure here, to make it easier to follow my analysis. 
 
Figure 1.1 A bivariate model of political protest 
 
      Protest voting 
    + 
 
Political distrust RRP-support
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A good and simple way to investigate the relationship in figure 1.1 is to look at the 
answers to questions that measure political trust among Radical Right Party 
supporters, and compare those to the answers of supporters of other parties. I have 
included a number of such questions in table 4.1 from each of the four countries in my 
study. The questions were asked at some time between 1989 and 1994. 
 
Table 4.1 Political distrust among Radical Right Party voters compared to other 
voters in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden around 1990. Percent distrusting 
answers, and the percentage differences between the two groups 
 Questions: RRP-voters
Other 
Voters 
Diff-
erence  N 
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each 
one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in 
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? 
Parliament (1990). 68 55 13** 165 905
The Civil service (1990). 66 55 11** 165 905A
U
ST
R
IA
 
The entire way our society is organized must be radically 
changed by revolutionary action (1990). 4 1 3 165 905
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each 
one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in 
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? 
Parliament (1990). 56 35 21** 154 1034
The Civil Service (1990). 67 53 14** 153 1030
The entire way our society is organized must be radically 
changed by revolutionary action (1990). 3 2 1 155 1035
Do you feel that most Norwegian politicians are 
competent, and usually know what they are doing, or do 
you think many of them have little knowledge in the 
matters they are set to deal with? (1989). 56 40 16** 194 1540
N
O
R
W
A
Y
 
In our country, do you feel that most politicians are 
trustworthy, that they are in general trustworthy, or that 
few of them are trustworthy? (1989). 33 11 22** 202 1593
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Table 4.1 Continued 
 Questions: RRP-voters
Other 
Voters 
Diff-
erence  N 
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each 
one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in 
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? 
Parliament (1990). 72 56 16** 76 1131
The Civil Service (1990). 73 46 27** 74 1128
The entire way our society is organized must be radically 
changed by revolutionary action (1990). 1 1 0 75 1145D
EN
M
A
R
K
 
Do you quite agree, partly agree, neither nor, partly 
disagree, or quite disagree with the following 
statements? In general one can trust our politicians to 
make the right decisions for the country (1994). 66 37 29** 92 1628
 
How much trust do you have in Danish politicians in 
general? Is it great trust, some trust, not much trust, or 
very little trust? (1994). 79 41 38** 92 1634
SW
ED
EN
 
Generally speaking, how much do you trust Swedish 
politicians? Do you trust them a great deal, quite a lot, 
not very much, or not at all (1991). 78 57 21** 162 2108
** Significant at the 1%-level. 
Level of significance is measured by use of Bernt Aardal and Frode Berglund's "Zigne" computer program. 
Distrusting alternatives are in italics.  
 
These results are not surprising for students of Radical Right Parties. On most 
questions, RRP-supporters are significantly more distrusting than other voters are. The 
differences between these groups are more than 10 percentage points on most 
questions, and on one question in Denmark, the difference is as high as 38. Overall, 
the effect of distrust seems weakest in Austria, and perhaps strongest in Denmark. I 
also find it interesting that Norwegians seem to be more trusting of their Parliament or 
parliamentarians, than Austrians and Danes do. Norwegian Progress Party supporters 
are more in line with “non-RRP voters” in both Austria and Denmark on this question. 
Finally, there is one question that does not produce any significant differences between 
the two groups, and that is the question about revolutionary societal change. As I 
indicated in chapter three, this question measures trust in the political system. It 
appears not to have an effect on RRP-support. Still, I will not draw any conclusions in 
that respect until I have performed a multivariate analysis. 
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I could end my analysis at this point. Table 4.1 appears to confirm the 
established argument that Radical Right Party voters are distrustful “protest voters”. 
But that is not an interesting finding, since it only serves to confirm numerous 
previous studies. Thus, I will perform a more complex analysis, where I make use of 
my theoretical and empirical frameworks. 
 
Protest at Two Levels 
I have previously argued that there are two types of political distrust and political 
protest. One is at a higher analytical level than the other is. “System distrust", or 
protest against the political system, is at the highest level. I have called the other type 
"elite distrust", or protest against the elite. This distinction constitutes my first 
expansion of figure 1.1 into a more complex analysis of RRP support. Figure 4.1 
illustrates the expanded model, which I will analyze in the following sections. 
 
Figure 4.1 A two-level model of political protest 
 
 
 
  System-protest 
 
 
  Elite Protest 
 
 
 
 
 
Elite 
distrust 
System 
distrust 
RRP-
support 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the two different hypotheses I discussed in chapter one. The 
"system-protest" hypothesis comes from my reading of Ignazi (1992), who argues that 
Radical Right Parties are anti-system parties. If his arguments apply to the voters of 
these parties, I should find a system-protest effect in my analysis. The "elite-protest" 
hypothesis is more in line with Heidar (1989) and Arter (1999) who see RRPs as "anti-
consensus" or "anti-establishment" parties. The latter hypothesis suggests that RRP-
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voters are merely hostile towards the elite, which is a less radical attitude than the anti-
system attitude. 
 
System- and Elite Distrust 
Figure 4.1 leaves one question unresolved, beyond the two hypotheses I have just 
outlined; namely: what is the relationship between system- and elite distrust? I have 
previously indicated that the two are positively correlated, but I find it necessary to 
take a closer look at the relationship. 
To simplify my discussion I presuppose that there are only two values to each 
of these variables: trust and distrust. A citizen can either trust or distrust the political 
elite, and he or she can either trust or distrust the political system. Clearly, peoples’ 
attitudes are more nuanced than that, but for the sake of my discussion, this is a useful 
distinction. I then have four possible types of attitudes, as illustrated by table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Four combinations of elite- and system 
trust / distrust. 
 System trust System distrust 
Elite trust 1 3 
Elite distrust 2 4 
 
It is important to note that attitudes toward the system are at a higher level than 
attitudes toward the elite. System-distrust is a “revolutionary” attitude, and I expect 
relatively few people to fall within that category. I anticipate that most people are at 
point 1 or 2, in table 4.2. Most of the variation in this table probably occurs between 
these two points, with Radical Right Party voters closer to 2 than the general 
population. However, there are always some people who distrust the system, and I 
expect most of them to be at point 4 in the table. People who distrust the system should 
also distrust the people who run and support the system, i.e. the political elite. You 
may be able to justify the attitude represented by point 3 in the table, but that requires 
an extensive and unusual argument. It is almost self-contradictory attitude, in the sense 
that it entails a lack of support of the system as a whole, combined with a positive 
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attitude towards those who embody the system. I do not believe anyone will fall within 
this category, irrespective of party-adherence. Point four in the table may or may not 
be dominated by RRP-supporters; I have yet to test that hypothesis. 
 If my observations are confirmed, I will see a weak positive correlation 
between the two variables. Most of the variation occurs between point 1 and 2, but 
there is a correlation, since those who distrust the system will also distrust the elite. I 
have tested these expectations on the 1990 World Values Survey data, and displayed 
the results in table 4.3. I have tried to make table 4.3 easy to interpret in light of my 
discussion, by making two dummy-variables of system- and elite trust or distrust. 
 
Table 4.3 The relationship between elite- and system distrust, in the populations 
as wholes, and among Radical Right Party Supporters, in Austria, Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden+. Percent of respondents in different categories, and the 
correlation between the two variables 
  Austria Norway Denmark Sweden 
  System 
trust 
System
distrust
System 
trust
System
distrust
System
trust
System
distrust
System 
trust
System
distrust
Elite trust 38 1 52 1 45 0 44 1
Elite distrust 59 2 46 2 53 1 50 5
Po
pu
-
la
tio
n 
Pearson’s r / (sum) .07 * (100) .06* (101) .06* (99) .20** (100)
Elite trust 27 1 34 0 22 0
Elite distrust 70 3 62 4 76 2
R
R
P-
vo
te
rs
 
Pearson’s r / (sum) .05 (101) .13 (100) .03 (100) 
 N   
 Population  1319 1283 1292  1246
 RRP-voters  151 155 68  
+ Sweden did not have an RRP at the time of the survey (1990). 
* Significant at the 5%-level. 
** Significant at the 1%-level. 
Questions and coding: 
“Elite trust” is measured by two questions: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you 
tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very 
much confidence or none at all? Parliament, the Civil Service.” Those who give a preponderance of trusting answers 
are coded as “Elite trust”; those who give the logically opposite answer to the two questions (e.g. quite a lot of 
confidence and not very much confidence) are excluded; and those who give a preponderance of distrusting answers 
are coded as “Elite distrust”. I have also made an index out of these two questions, from 1 to 7, which I used to 
measure the correlation between the variables.  
“System trust” is measured by one question:  “On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we 
live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. 1) The entire way our society is organized must 
be radically changed by revolutionary action. 2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. 3) Our present 
society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.” Those who answered 1) are coded as “system 
distrust”, those who answered one of the others are coded as “system trust”. 
Source: World Value Survey 1990 
 
There is some variation in table 4.3, both between countries, and between the 
populations as wholes and RRP-supporters. But most of the variation is between what 
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is equivalent to points 1 and 2 in table 4.2. Most people trust the system, but they 
disagree as to the trustworthiness of the political elite. Austrians in general are most 
distrusting towards the elite; supporters of the Danish Progress Party express the 
highest level of distrust of RRP-voters. Furthermore, some citizens distrust the system, 
and those who do, combine that attitude with distrust of the elite. I expected no one to 
distrust the system and at the same time trust the elite. The data in table 4.3 comes 
very close to confirming that expectation. The limited number of respondents who fall 
within this category may just be a result of misunderstandings and errors. Finally, as 
one can see from the distribution of the respondents in the four categories, the two 
variables are weakly but positively correlated. However, the strength of the correlation 
and its significance varies. Most notably, there appears to be a stronger correlation in 
Sweden than in the other countries. I can offer no immediate explanation for that. 
None of the correlations among RRP-voters are significant, which is not surprising 
given the small N, and an overall weak correlation. 
 I have now explored the relationship between system- and elite trust. However, 
I have not been able to determine the causal direction of the arrow in my analytical 
model; does elite distrust lead to system distrust, or the other way around? I have 
argued that someone who distrust the system should also distrust the elite, but that 
does not determine which comes first. Gamson (1968) argued that elite distrust 
eventually leads to distrust at a higher level, i.e. system distrust. But you could also 
argue that “revolutionary” attitudes toward a system lead to skepticism or hostility 
toward those who run the system. I believe the arrow runs both ways, as my model 
indicates, and that it is impossible to definitively determine its causal direction. In real 
life, people do not deduct their attitudes in a perfectly logical and coherent manner, so 
I should not try to enforce some logic to my model that is not supported by empirical 
evidence. Hence, I will accept the model as it is, with the causal arrow pointing in both 
directions. 
 Finally, table 4.3 can be used to make some observations about my research 
questions and hypotheses. It appears that Radical Right Party voters are less trusting of 
the political elite than the population as a whole is, which supports the “elite protest 
hypothesis”. There is also a slight difference in system distrust in table 4.3, with RRP-
 76
voters expressing more distrust. This may support the “system protest hypothesis”, but 
the differences may also be too small for there to be any significant effect. I will try to 
come up with a more definitive answer to these questions in the following section. 
 
Protest Voting at Two Levels 
I will now take a closer look at the effect of system- and elite distrust on RRP-support. 
Thus, I hope to reject or confirm some of my hypotheses. Table 4.4 shows both the 
bivariate effects of the two trust-variables on RRP-support and the combined effect of 
the two variables in a regression analysis. The data comes from the 1990 World 
Values Survey, which includes Sweden. However, the survey was conducted prior to 
the formation of New Democracy, so, Sweden cannot be part of this analysis. 
 
Table 4.4 Bivariate and combined effects of system- and elite distrust, on support for 
the Radical Right Parties of Austria, Norway, and Denmark, in 1990 
 Austria (FPÖ) Norway (Progress) Denmark (Progress) 
 Bivariate + Combined++ Bivariate Combined Bivariate Combined 
System distrust .06 * .06 .02 .00 .01 .01 
Elite distrust .11 ** .11** .16** .16** .13** .13**
Explained variance, R2  .02**  .03**  .02**
Standard deviations:         
System distrust   .14  .15   .12 
Elite distrust   1.31  1.17   1.23 
Dependent variable   .36  .34   .24 
N   1064  1182   1195 
+ Measured by Pearson’s r. 
++ Measured by standardized regression coefficients. 
* Significant at the 5%-level. 
** Significant at the 1%-level. 
Questions and coding: “On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the 
one which best describes your own opinion. 1) The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by 
revolutionary action. 2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. 3) Our present society must be valiantly 
defended against all subversive forces.” Those who answered 1) are coded as “1=system distrust”, those who answered one 
of the others are coded as “0=system trust”. 
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it 
a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Parliament; the civil service.” 
The answers are coded on a scale from “1” to “7”. Those who answered “a great deal” on both questions are coded as “1”, 
while those with the least confidence in both instances are coded as “7”. 
Source: World Values Survey 1990. 
 
I have included the standard deviations of the variables, in accordance with my 
methodological discussion in chapter three. There are no dramatic deviations from one 
country to another. Denmark may look different, because the standard deviation of the 
dependent variable is a little smaller there than in the other two countries. Still, I 
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believe they are similar enough for comparison across countries, which is what I hoped 
for. 
The table provides some interesting results that have a direct bearing on two of 
my hypotheses. The “system protest hypothesis” is not supported by this analysis. 
Radical Right Party voters do not appear to be motivated by a desire to protest against 
the political system. There is a weak, significant, bivariate effect in Austria, but it 
disappears with the inclusion of the elite-variable. This finding is not what one would 
expect from reading some of the literature and commentary on Radical Right Parties in 
recent years. Contrary to these writings, RRP-voters do not dislike the political 
systems in their countries; at least their attitudes in that respect have no effect on their 
voting. 
Radical Right Party voters’ attitudes toward the political elite appear to have an 
effect, though. There is a similar, significant effect in all three countries, which falls 
within my definition of political protest. Hence, RRP-supporters are “protest voters”, 
since they express disapproval of the political elite through their vote. The effect is 
fairly similar in each of the countries. The similarities are also striking for the overall 
effect of the model, as measured by R2. It shows a small explained variance in all 
three analyses, which means that the protest variables have a limited effect, and that 
there must be some other more important factors that explain RRP-support. 
So far, I have found that RRP-voters are motivated by protest against the 
political elite, but this motivation is not central to their choice on Election Day. Table 
4.4 shows that there must be other factors that have an effect on peoples’ support for 
these parties. I hope to fill in the missing pieces in my analysis in the next section of 
this chapter, where I utilize the entire model of protest voting. 
 
A Multivariate Analysis of Political Protest 
I have now reached the point where I will analyze the expanded model of protest 
voting, as I have indicated by figure 1.2. I have discussed most relevant theoretical and 
methodological questions that have a bearing on the model, so I will proceed straight 
to my analysis. I will start with a comparative analysis of the World Values Survey 
data, before I analyze each country separately, by use of the national data sets. 
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Figure 1.2 A multivariate model of political protest 
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I have performed a regression analysis of figure 1.2 on the 1990 World Values Survey. 
I used four questions as measures of “issues and belief systems”. They are, in addition 
to the left-right scale, one assertion to the effect that higher taxes are justified to pay 
for environmental protection. Another deals with employment of immigrants versus 
native citizens, and the final one is more of an old politics question: if government 
ownership of business and industry should be increased. I have coded these four 
variables so that the highest value is what I expect to be the “Radical Right” view. 
That should mean that the variables have a positive effect on RRP-support. I have 
displayed the results in table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 Impact of system- and elite distrust, as well as three issues and one 
ideology-scale, on support for the Radical Right Parties of Austria, Norway, 
and Denmark, in 1990. Standardized regression coefficients 
 Austria (FPÖ) Norway (Progress) Denmark (Progress) 
System distrust .05 .01 .01 
Elite distrust .11** .14** .12** 
Taxes vs. environment .03 .05 .03 
Jobs to immigrants .07* .13** .16** 
Business ownership .04 .06 .07* 
Left-right scale .08* .24** .13** 
Explained variance, R2 .03** .14** .09** 
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Table 4.5 continued 
Standard deviations: Austria (FPÖ) Norway (Progress) Denmark (Progress) 
Taxes vs. environment .97 .86 .87 
Jobs to immigrants .76 .96 .94 
Business ownership 2.15 2.05 2.20 
Left-right scale 1.73 2.04 1.90 
N 882 1053 1069 
* Significant at the 5%-level. 
** Significant at the 1%-level. 
For the standard deviations of system distrust, elite distrust, and the dependent variable, see table 4.4. 
Questions and coding: “On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please 
choose the one which best describes your own opinion. 1) The entire way our society is organized must be 
radically changed by revolutionary action. 2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. 3) Our 
present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.” Those who answered 1) are coded as 
1 (=system distrust), those who answered one of the others are coded as 0 (=system trust). 
“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you 
have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at 
all? Parliament; the civil service.” The answers are coded on a scale from “1” to “7”. Those who answered “a 
great deal” on both questions are coded as “1”, while those with the least confidence in both instances are 
coded as “7”. 
“I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one I read out, can you tell me 
whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly? I would agree to an increase in taxes if the 
extra money were used to prevent environmental damage.” Coded on a scale from “1” to “4”. Agree 
strongly=1. Disagree strongly=1. 
“Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority
to [own nationality] over immigrants” Disagree=1, Neither=2, Agree=3. 
“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 
means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement 
on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.” 1= 
”Government ownership of business and industry should be increased”. 10= “Private ownership of business 
and industry should be increased”,  
“In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, 
generally speaking?” 1=left, 10=right. 
Source: World Values Survey 1990. 
 
I consider these standard deviations similar enough to permit comparisons across 
countries. However, it is worth keeping in mind that the dependent variable varies a 
little less in Denmark than the other two countries. That should lead the reader’s 
attention towards the general trends in table 4.5, and not focus too much on the exact 
values of the coefficients. 
The results in this table should be seen in light of table 4.4. The effects of the 
two elite-variables are almost identical in the two tables. Hence, issues or belief 
systems do not influence the "protest effect"; it exists independently of the latter 
variables. That means that the “elite protest”-effect that I found in the previous section 
of this chapter, really is a form of “diffuse protest” (see page 40). Radical Right Party 
supporters protest against the elite, but they do not do so because of some specific 
issue or cluster of issues. So, this evidence refutes the idea that RRP-supporters’ 
political distrust stems from their protest against specific government policies. Rather, 
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these voters express a direct protest against elites, which I believe I can best describe 
in Easton’s (1965) term, as “diffuse”. 
Another interesting point of comparison between tables 4.4 and 4.5 is the 
difference in the overall effects of these two models. R2 increases with the inclusion of 
the “issues and belief systems” variables in both Norway and Denmark. The increase 
is significant but not as remarkable in Austria, as in the other countries. These changes 
are not surprising, given the low levels of R2 in table 4.4; but they are interesting 
because they confirm my previous argument that protest is not an important 
consideration for RRP-supporters. These voters are to a greater extent motivated by 
issues and belief systems. In sum, I have found a protest effect in RRP-supporters’ 
choice of political party, but the effect is not as important as other considerations. This 
conclusion is as valid in Austria as it is in Norway and Denmark. R2 in table 4.4 is at a 
similar low level for Austria as in the other two countries. The fact that it does not 
increase much in table 4.5 merely indicates that those specific issues are not important 
for supporters of the FPÖ. Nevertheless, there are some other factors at play in 
Austria, besides political protest, that have a more determined effect on peoples’ 
choice to vote for the Freedom Party. 
Finally, the effects of the issues-variables are worth a brief comment. The jobs-
to-immigrants-question and the left-right scale have significant effects in all three 
countries. Hence, immigration is important for these voters, but they also think in 
terms of a more general belief-system. The analysis does not indicate how the voters 
interpret the left-right scale, other than that it has an effect. The other issues-questions 
do not have substantial effects in the multivariate analysis. However, almost all of the 
variables have an effect in a bivariate analysis28, and are thus relevant for RRP-
supporters. The left-right scale probably absorbs some of the effects of the issues-
variables; which supports the idea that these voters use an overall belief-system in 
their political thinking.  
In sum, my comparative analysis indicates that RRP-voters are motivated by 
distrust toward the political elite. Still, most of their motivation comes from substantial 
                                              
28 The only one of these effects that is not significant in a bivariate analysis, is the taxes versus environment 
question in Austria. 
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issues and belief systems. With these observations in mind, I will move on to analyze 
each country separately. 
 
Austria 
The Exit Poll-surveys from Austria do not permit the same kind of statistical analysis 
as the other surveys do. The polling firm Fessel only asked voters about their 
motivations for voting for one party or another. However, since motivations are what I 
am studying, I should be able to make use of the surveys to shed light on my research 
questions. As I indicated in chapter three, I have coded FPÖ-voters’ responses to the 
poll-questions into six categories (see table A.1). The categorization in itself produced 
some interesting findings. I was not able to find a single answer that can be interpreted 
as “system protest”, in the sense that I have used that term. Some of the nuances of the 
respondents’ answers may have been lost in the first round of coding, or in the 
translations to English, but that is an uncertainty that I have to accept. I will argue that 
supporters of the Freedom Party do not express any kind of protest against the political 
system in Austria. They do, however, express protest against the political elite. Table 
4.6 displays the frequencies of “elite protest” and the other five categories of 
motivations, from 1986 to 1999. Since each respondent could give an unlimited 
number of answers to these questions, the frequencies add up to more than 100 
percent. 
 
Table 4.6 Reasons for FPÖ-vote in six categories from 1986 to 1999, percent. 
 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 Mean 
Elite protest 52 79 85 85 77 79 
Issues or ideology 17 48 56 75 58 56 
Personal vote 78 49 43 43 43 47 
Likes the FPÖ 35 42 40 38 55 44 
Opposition support 75 12 16 19 67 36 
Residual 20 22 27 31 11 22 
Sum 277 252 267 291 311 283 
N 205 354 499 472 589 465 
Source: Austrian Exit Polls 
 
Before I start interpreting table 4.6, I will point to one of John Zaller’s (1992) 
axioms in his theory of mass opinions. He states: “individuals answer questions by 
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averaging across the considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them” 
(p49). Table 4.6 provides several examples of this. One is the large group of people 
indicating a “personal vote” as their motivation for voting FPÖ in 1986. The election 
that year came after a prolonged public struggle for leadership of the Freedom Party, 
after which Jörg Haider emerged as victorious. That probably made more people think 
about him when they answered this question, than would otherwise be the case. The 
“opposition support”-category varies greatly from one election year to another, which 
indicates a “randomness” that Zaller’s axiom explains. Yet there are some results in 
the table are fairly stable over time, especially from 1990 onwards. Political protest 
seems by far the most important motivation for FPÖ voters, but it is not the only one. 
Overall, more than half the voters also mention issues or ideological considerations. A 
substantial number of the responses indicate a diffuse positive attitude toward the 
FPÖ, which falls within the category “likes the FPÖ”. In sum, I believe the evidence in 
table 4.6 clearly shows that most FPÖ-voters are motivated by political protest, though 
other factors also have an effect. 
The average for these five elections indicates that as many as 79 percent of 
FPÖ-voters are “protest voters”. That is a surprisingly large proportion, but it is worth 
keeping in mind that the respondents could give as many reasons as they wanted to, 
and the table does not say anything about which motivation is the most important. I 
will proceed to look more closely at the protest voters in table 4.6 to find out if they 
had any other motivations for voting FPÖ. The large N in these surveys allows me to 
make an analysis where I select only FPÖ-voters who were motivated by protest. 
Table 4.7 shows the percentage of protest voters who mentioned one or several 
protest-reasons, and the percentage of those who also mention one or several other 
reasons. Hence, the table serves as a more detailed look at the group of voters 
represented in the first row in table 4.6. 
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Table 4.7 Protest voters who are only motivated by political protest, and 
those who have additional reasons for voting FPÖ. Percent 
 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 Mean 
Only elite protest 6 10 9 4 4 6 
Additional reasons 94 90 91 96 96 94 
Sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 107 278 422 403 453 382 
Source: Austrian Exit Polls 
 
The table shows that most protest voters are motivated by other factors as well. On 
average, only 6 percent of them give no other reason for voting FPÖ29. The collective 
effect of other reasons for voting FPÖ seems more important than political protest, 
even for the “protest voters”. Although I have no definitive proof of this, the evidence 
points in that direction. Elite protest may still be the most important consideration for 
these voters, but I find that to be unlikely. If so, I would have expected more people to 
be in the “elite protest only”-category. It is more likely that most FPÖ-voters share a 
distrust of the political elite, but that other factors are more important to their voting. 
The latter interpretation is more in line with the results of my previous regression 
analysis. Hence, it is fair to say that supporters of the Austrian Freedom Party are 
motivated by a desire to protest against the political elite. However, this motivation 
has a limited effect compared to the sum of other factors that influence voting. 
  
Norway 
The Norwegian data enables me to perform a statistical analysis along the lines of my 
comparative analysis of the 1990 World Values Survey data. I will use three surveys 
from the period I am studying, one from each election survey in 1989, 1993 and 1997. 
Unfortunately, none of these include a measure of “system distrust” as I have used that 
term. However, there is one question in the 1977 election survey that requires the 
respondent to rate his or her satisfaction with the “organization of Norwegian society”. 
It resembles the question I used in the World Values Survey. I will use the 1977-data 
as well, even though it falls outside my timeframe, and despite the Progress Party not 
                                              
29 That does not mean that they only gave one reason. Rather, they could have given any number of reasons, all 
of which I have categorized as “elite protest” (see table A.1). 
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gaining much support in the election. It can serve as a point of comparison with the 
other surveys. 
I have used two questions as measures of elite distrust, which I have made into 
a scale from 1 to 5. Both questions use politicians in general as objects of trust or 
distrust. I have selected four issues from each of the surveys, in addition to the left-
right scale. The questions are almost identical in the four years, except for one 
question about immigration that was not asked in 1977. I have decided to use a 
question about “guest workers” from that year instead. Table 4.8 shows the results of 
four regression-analyses of my model in Norway. 
 
Table 4.8 Effect of system- and elite trust, as well as four issues and one ideology 
scale, on support for the Norwegian Progress Party in 1977; and the effect of elite 
trust and four issues and an ideology scale on Progress Party support in 1989, 
1993, and 1997. Standardized regression coefficients 
 1977 1989 1993 1997 
System distrust -.02 -.01       
Elite distrust .10** .09** .16** .11** .04 .01 .15** .10**
Lower taxes  .04  -.03  .01  .00 
Industry vs. Environment  .04  -.04  -.01  -.03 
Guest workers  .04       
Immigration a threat    .18**  .08**  .23**
Gov't control of business  -.04  .07**  .01  -.06* 
Left-right scale  .05  .28**  .21**  .27**
Explained variance, R2 .01** .02** .03** .16** .00 .06** .02** .16**
Standard deviations:          
System trust  .60        
Elite trust  1.19  1.28  1.28   1.24 
Lower taxes  1.36  1.34  1.38   1.42 
Industry vs. Environment  1.30  1.35  1.32   1.28 
Guest workers  .38        
Immigration a threat    1.52  1.56   1.47 
Gov't control of business  1.34  1.22  1.36   1.31 
Left-right scale  1.65  2.02  1.93   2.15 
Dependent variable  .11  .32  .21   .31 
N  1088  1512  1492   1607 
*Significant at the 5%-level. 
**Significant at the 1%-level. 
Questions and coding: 
System trust (1977): "Would you say that you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied at 
all with the way our society is organized in Norway?" Coded on a scale from 1 (=very satisfied) to 4 (=not satisfied at 
all). 
Elite trust (two questions): "Do you feel that most Norwegian politicians are competent, and usually know what they are 
doing, or do you think many of them have little knowledge in the matters they are set to deal with?" "In our country, do 
you feel that most politicians are trustworthy, that they are in general trustworthy, or that few of them are trustworthy?" 
Made into an index from 1 (=high trust) to 5 (=high distrust). 
Lower taxes and gov't control of business: "I shall now read to you a list of proposed policies that some people think 
should be implemented in Norway. For each of these proposals, please say if you think it is very important to implement 
it, quite important, if you are not concerned with the issue, if you think it is quite important not to implement it, or if you 
think it is very important not to implement it. Cut taxes on high incomes. Reduce government control of private 
 85
industry." Coded on a scale from 1 (=very important not to implement) 5 (=very important to implement). 
Industry versus environment and immigration a threat: "Do you completely agree, agree somewhat, neither nor, disagree 
somewhat, or completely disagree with the following statements. We still need to develop industry in order to ensure 
economic growth, even if it conflicts with environmental concerns. Immigration is a serious threat to our national 
heritage." Coded on a scale from 1 (=completely disagree) to 5 (=completely agree). 
Guest workers (1977): "People disagree about the guest workers that have come to our country. Here are some of the 
most common views.  Please let me know which is closer to your opinion. Guest workers should not have any access to 
the Norwegian labor market. Guest workers should only be let into the country if there are available jobs for them. Guest 
workers should freely be able to settle in the country." Coded from 1 (=settle freely) to 3 (= no access). 
Left-right scale: Question and scale varies somewhat. In 1977 it was worded as follows: "There is a lot of talk these days 
of redicalism and conservativism. Here is a scale from 1 on the right – representing those who stand on the extreme right 
politically - to 9 on the left – representing those who stand on the extreme left politically. Where would you place 
yourself on this scale?" In 1989 and 1993, the scale goes from 1 (=far left) to 10 (=far right), and in 1997, from 0 (= far 
left) to 10 (=far right). I have recoded the 1977-scale so that 9=far right and 1=far left. I have used the other scales as 
originally coded. 
Sources: the Norwegian Electoral Program of 1977, 1989, 1993, and 1997. 
 
As table 4.8 indicates, 1977 is a deviant year in many respects. Hence, the results of 
that analysis cannot be directly compared to the other years. However, the data from 
1977 confirms my previous findings, that system distrust has no effect on RRP-
support, while elite-distrust does. None of the issue-effects are significant, and R2 
remains small. 
 The standard deviations in table 4.8 vary somewhat between years. That is 
especially the case with the dependent variable. 1977 deviates, but 1993 also looks a 
little different. That is probably because it was a bad election for the Progress Party30, 
and it was an election marked by the debate over EU-membership. Aardal and Valen 
(1995), as well as Bjørklund and Hellevik (1993) have commented on that election’s 
“peculiarities”, and on how it deviates from general trends in Norwegian politics. 
There seems to be no effect of elite distrust on Progress Party support in 1993. Maybe 
that is because the anti-elitist voters opted for the anti-EU parties in that election. 
 Since both 1977 and 1993 are deviant years, I am left with 1989 and 1997 as 
my two main points of comparison. The standard deviations in table 4.8 indicate that 
those two years are well suited for comparison over time. The results of the two 
analyses confirm most of my findings from the comparative analysis. But, unlike in 
table 4.5, the Norwegian data shows a slight decrease in the effect of elite distrust with 
the inclusion of the issue-variables. Hence, some of the distrust of RRP-supporters is 
“specific distrust”; it stems from disagreement over political issues. Still, most of the 
                                              
30 The Progress Party gained 6.3 percent of the votes. 
 86
effect remains in the multivariate analysis, and thus, I consider this finding to support 
the “diffuse protest hypothesis”. 
 The change in R2 from the bivariate to the multivariate model resembles what I 
have previously found. The low R2 in the bivariate model indicates that political 
protest is not an important motivation for Progress Party supporters; and the increased 
R2 in the multivariate model means that “issues and belief systems” have a much 
larger effect. Hence, Progress Party voters are motivated by elite protest, but that is not 
what determines their voting. Substantial issues seem much more important. That is 
particularly true for immigration as a political issue. The effect of most of the other 
issues appears to be absorbed by the left-right scale31, which is what I would expect 
from such a measure of “belief systems”. 
 Overall, I have found the same diffuse elite protest effect over time in Norway, 
as I did in the comparative analysis. My means of measuring system protest were 
limited to one question I 1977, but the results supported what I have previously found, 
namely that there is no such effect on Progress Party support. However, political issues 
did have an effect, and more so than political protest. Hence, Progress Party voters 
may be “protest voters”, but substantial policy considerations are really what motivate 
their choices. I will now move on to Denmark, to see if the same effects are at work 
there. 
 
Denmark 
The available data from Denmark do not include any measures of system distrust, 
which satisfy my criteria for the variable. I will have to rely on my findings from the 
comparative analysis, which indicated that system distrust have no effect on support 
for the Danish Progress Party. 
                                              
31 All issue variables, except “industry versus environment” in 1993, have positive significant effects on Progress 
Party support, in bivariate analyses. When I control for belief system in the multivariate analysis, some of these 
effects disappear. Still, I find it a little surprising that the “control of business”-variable in 1997 has a positive 
bivariate effect and a negative controlled effect, both significant. It probably has to do with the different types of 
voters that are attracted to the Progress Party. Some ideological conservatives may account for the positive 
bivariate effect, but then the ideology-scale absorbs the effect that those people have. In addition, some non-
ideological, perhaps working class, voters weaken the effect in the bivariate analysis, and furthermore, account 
for the negative effect when ideological voters are controlled for. 
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  I have found two measures of elite trust that I will use separately in my 
analyses. Both questions were asked in 1994 and 1998, while only one was part of the 
1987-88-survey. The same question was also part of the 1973-survey in Denmark. I 
have decided to include it in my analysis as well, as a historical point of reference. 
1973 was the first election for the Progress Party, and a highly successful one: they 
gained 15.9 percent of the votes. That makes it interesting as a comparison with the 
1990s. 
 The 1987-88-data comes from a panel-survey that the Danish election program 
conducted in relation to two elections, which were some of the least successful 
elections for the Progress Party. Consequently, their supporters constitute a very small 
proportion of the respondents in the survey. So, in order to increase that proportion, I 
have defined Progress Party supporters as people who voted for the party in either of 
the two elections. I believe that will make the dependent variables more similar in each 
year, and thus, I will be able to compare my analyses over time. 
 Finally, since I have defined both the Danish People’s Party and the Progress 
Party as “Radical Right Parties”, I will consider those who voted for either of the two 
parties in 1998 as RRP-supporters. I have displayed the results of my analyses in table 
4.9. I have used three issue-variables and one left-right scale. Neither of them are part 
of the 1973-survey, so that analysis is only equivalent to the first regression in the 
other years. 
 
Table 4.9 Effect of two indicators of elite trust as well as three issues and one 
ideology scale in support for Danish Radical Right parties in 1973, 1987-88, 
1994, and 1998. 
 1973 1987-88 1994 1998 
Elite distrust 1 .15 ** -.03 .03 .06* .05 .07* .06 * 
Elite distrust 2    .16** .13** .21** .15 ** 
Immigration a threat   .20**  .14**  .23 ** 
Industry vs. environment   .04  .01  -.03 
Punish crime   .00  .02  -.02 
Left-right scale   .13**  .12**  .13 ** 
Explained variance, R2 .02 ** .00 .08** .04** .08** .06** .14 ** 
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Table 4.9 continued 
Standard deviations: 1973  1987-88  1994  1998  
Elite trust 1 1.26   1.49  1.24  1.13  
Elite trust 2      .72  .72  
Immigration a threat    1.71  1.66  1.55  
Industry vs. Environment    1.42  1.37  1.29  
Punish crime    1.08  .87  1.01  
Left-right scale    1.70  1.98  2.27  
Dependent variable .34   .25  .22  .29  
N 484   757  1431  1670  
*Significant at the 1%-level. 
**Significant at the 5%-level. 
Questions and coding: 
Elite trust 1: "Do you quite agree, partly agree, neither nor, partly disagree, or quite disagree with the following 
statements? In general one can trust our politicians to make the right decisions for the country" Coded on a scale 
from 1 (=quite agree) to 5(=quite disagree). 
Elite trust 2: "How much trust do you have in Danish politicians in general? Is it great trust, some trust, not much 
trust, or very little trust? Coded on a scale from 1(=great trust) to 4 (=very little trust). 
Immigration a threat, industry vs. Environment, punish crime: "Do you quite agree, partly agree, neither nor, 
partly disagree, or quite disagree with the following statements? Immigration constitutes a threat to our national 
culture. Economic growth should be secured by means of industrial build-up even though this may conflict with 
environmental concerns. Violent crime should be punished far stricter than it is today". Coded on scales from 1 
(=quite disagree) to 5 (=quite agree). 
Left-right scale: "In politics one often talks about left and right (show card…) where would you place yourself on 
this scale?" The scale goes from 1(=far left) to 10 (=far right). 
Sources: the Danish Electoral Program of 1973, 1987, 1988, 1994, and 1998. 
 
The results of table 4.9 are similar to both the comparative analysis and my findings 
for Norway. Overall, the table shows that elite trust has a limited effect, most of which 
remains when I include the issues-variables. The latter has a stronger effect on RRP-
support than the trust variables. Furthermore, I believe I should be able to compare the 
results of the three analyses from 1987 to 1998, since the standard deviations do not 
change much in those years. 
Some deviant results in the table are worth commenting on. The 1987-88-data 
shows no effect of elite trust. I have no immediate explanation why, other than the fact 
that these were bad elections for the Progress Party. There were some similarly deviant 
elections in Norway, where the trust-variable had no effect. That may indicate that not 
only does elite trust have a weak effect on RRP-support, it may also be an unstable 
effect that shifts with changing times. However, the significant effect in 1973 indicates 
that RRP-supporters have been protest voters ever since the party's establishment. 
Apparently, the left-right scale and a question about immigration are the only 
attitude-questions that have significant effects on RRP-support. That is not the case 
when I look at each issue individually; they all have significant bivariate effects on 
RRP-support. I assume that the left-right scale absorbs these effects. Still, the apparent 
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strength of the immigration-issue, even when controlled for an overall belief system is 
surprising, and it reveals some of the appeal of the two Radical Right Parties in 
Denmark. 
 The general pattern in this Danish analysis is in accordance with my previous 
findings. RRP-supporters in Denmark express some form of “diffuse protest”, directed 
at the political elite, and it is a significant motivation for their choice on Election Day. 
However, diffuse protest is not that important, compared to more “substantial” 
motivations, such as political issues and belief systems. 
 
Sweden 
New Democracy only participated in the one election in Sweden, in 1991. Thus, I will 
only perform one regression analysis on Swedish data. I have previously argued that 
New Democracy is part of a larger "family" of Radical Right Parties, which makes just 
one election interesting in a comparative perspective. My analysis of the 1991-election 
should be seen as one of a larger group of elections with Radical Right Parties.  
There are no questions that measure system trust in the Swedish election survey 
of 1991. This is unfortunate, because this is the only survey where I can analyze New 
Democracy voters. As previously mentioned the 1990 WVS did not measure support 
for New Democracy, since the survey was conducted prior to the formation of the 
party. However, I believe my previous analyses of the other three countries strongly 
indicate that system distrust has no effect on RRP-support. I will assume that is the 
case for New Democracy as well. 
Table 4.10 displays the results of my analysis of the Swedish data. I have used 
one question to measure elite trust, as well as three issue-questions, and the by now 
well-known left-right scale. 
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Table 4.10 Impact of elite distrust separately, and in 
combination with three issue questions, and one ideology-
scale, on support for New Democracy, in the 1991 Swedish 
election. Standardized regression coefficients 
Elite distrust .16** .13**
Environment versus economic growth .07**
Lower immigration .12**
Reduce government influence over business .08**
Left-right scale .02 
Explained variance, R2 .03** .06**
Standard deviations:  
Elite distrust .69 
Environment versus economic growth 2.40 
Lower immigration 1.24 
Reduce government influence over business 1.11 
Left-right scale 2.15 
Dependent variable .26 
N 2270 1859 
* Significant at the 5%-level 
** Significant at the 1%-level. 
Questions and coding: “Generally speaking, how much do you trust Swedish 
politicians? Do you trust them a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or not at all?” 
Coded on a scale from 1= “a great deal” to 4= ”not at all”. 
“On this card are listed some suggestions for possible future societies that some 
people want us to pursue here in Sweden. I would like to hear what you think of these 
suggestions. Please answer according to this [10-point] scale. A high number on the 
scale means that you like the suggestion, a low number means that you dislike it. What 
do you think about the suggestion that we should pursue an environmentally friendly 
society, even if that leads to low or no economic growth?” Re-coded, so that 0= a very 
good suggestion, and 10= a very bad suggestion. 
“I will now read you some things that different people want to implement in Sweden. 
For each suggestion, could you please tell me if you think it is a very good suggestion, 
a fairly good suggestion, neither a good nor a bad suggestion, a fairly bad suggestion, 
or a very bad suggestion? Accept fewer immigrants to Sweden; reduce the 
government’s influence over private business”. Both are coded on a scale from 1= 
very bad suggestion, to 5= very good suggestion. 
“Sometimes we imagine the parties ordered according to their position on a scale from 
left to right. On this card is a scale from 0 [=left] to 10 [=right]. Where would you 
place yourself on this scale?” Coded from 0 to 10. 
Source: Swedish Election Program 1991 
 
The results in table 4.10 are similar to what I have found in the previous analyses. Elite 
trust has a significant effect that remains almost unchanged when I control for the 
attitude-variables. The "diffuse protest hypothesis" is confirmed once again; as is my 
observation that protest is a significant, yet relatively unimportant motivation for RRP 
voters. An R2 of only .03 indicates that other factors, besides protest, are more 
important for New Democracy voters. However, I have only captured some of the 
other factors with the four attitude-questions. An R2 of .06 in the multivatiate analysis 
is not very impressive either. 
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Surprisingly, the left-right scale does not appear to have an effect, while all the 
specific issue-questions are significant in the analysis. The left-right scale actually had 
a significant, albeit weak, bivariate effect that disappeared when controlled for other 
variables. That is the opposite of what happened in the other analyses, where the scale 
appeared to absorb the effect of some of the individual issues. This finding may 
indicate that New Democracy was more of a "populist" party than the other parties I 
have analyzed, in the sense that it gained most of its support from popular stances on 
specific issues rather than from an overall view of politics. 
In sum, I believe my analysis of the Swedish data confirms what I found in the 
other countries. New Democracy voters protested against the political elite, but that 
was only a minor part of their motivation on Election Day. Political issues were 
probably more important than protest, but they were not motivated by a general belief 
system. The last observation makes the Swedish voters a little different from the other 
RRP-voters I have studied in this chapter. 
 
A Summary of the Multivariate Analysis 
Before I continue my discussion, I will summarize my findings. It looks as if Radical 
Right Party voters distrust the political elite, and are motivated by distrust when they 
vote. That makes them "protest voters" according to my definition of the term. 
However, they are not protest voters in the sense that they distrust the political system. 
Rather, they are as supporting of their country's political system as voters for other 
parties are. 
 Furthermore, I have found strong support for the "diffuse protest hypothesis". 
That is, RRP voters do not protest against some specific policy or another; they are 
generally skeptical of the political elite irrespective of political issues. These voters’ 
“diffuse protest” may mean that they express a deep-rooted, and perhaps, long lasting 
distrust. My analysis of country-specific data seemed to indicate that, since the effect 
of distrust remained fairly stable over time. However, I have also found that elite 
distrust is relatively unimportant for RRP voters' choices on Election Day. They are 
mostly motivated by their attitudes and belief-systems. Hence, even though I have 
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confirmed one of the protest-hypotheses, any conclusions based on that should be 
strongly modified. RRP voters should not be seen as "protest only voters". 
Since I have not found an explanation for the significant, albeit weak effect of 
political protest, I find my conclusions to be less than satisfactory. The diffuse protest 
hypothesis is just that: diffuse. Thus, I will explore my findings further by looking at 
other groups of political parties to see if there are similar or different effects at work 
among their voters. I hope such an analysis will shed some light on what I have found 
so far. 
 
Protest or Opposition Voting? 
In addition to being similar political parties, the Radical Right Parties I have looked at 
had one thing in common in the timeframe of my analysis: they were opposition 
parties. Neither of them took part in the formation of any of these countries' 
governments. FPÖ participated in one governing coalition in the early 1980s and are 
now part of another coalition. However, since my analysis of Austrian data spanned 
from 1986 to 1999, I did not capture any of those periods. 
 My analysis indicated that RRP-voters distrust the political elite to some extent. 
The people in government are part of the political elite, which makes it possible that 
RRP-voters’ distrust is directed at them. The protest effect that I found in my analysis 
may not be the result of any unique characteristics of RRP-supporters; rather, distrust 
could be a shared attitude among all opposition party voters. I will try to test that 
hypothesis in the remaining part of this chapter, by looking at other “families” of 
political parties. I will start by looking at a group of parties that are at the opposite end 
of the ideological spectrum compared to RRPs, namely Left Libertarian Parties. 
 
Left Libertarian Parties 
The term “left libertarian” comes from Kitshelt (1997), and refers to New Left Parties 
or Green Parties. All of the four countries I am studying have a party like that. Austria 
and Sweden have Green Parties, while Denmark and Norway have the “Socialist 
People’s Party”, and the “Socialist Left Party”, respectively. None of these parties 
have participated in governing coalitions. They are, like the Radical Right Parties, 
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"permanent" opposition parties. But they are also ideological opposites of RRPs, and I 
expect that to be reflected in an analysis of their voters. The issues and belief systems 
of Left Libertarian voters should have the opposite effect of what they did in my 
analysis of RRP-voters. The same may or may not be true of the trust-variables. Table 
4.11 shows the results of my analysis on the 1990 World Values Survey data. I have 
performed the same analysis as in table 4.5, with “support for a Left Libertarian party” 
as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 4.11 Impact of system- and elite distrust, as well as three issues and one 
ideology-scale, on support for the Left Libertarian Parties of Austria, Norway, 
and Denmark in 1990. Standardized regression coefficients 
 Austria 
(Greens) 
Norway 
(Socialist Left) 
Denmark 
(Socialist People)
Sweden 
(Greens) 
System distrust -.02 .00 .06* .05 .00 .00 .04 .05 
Elite distrust .14** .12** .10** .12** .10** .10** .07 .10**
Taxes vs. Environment  -.10**  -.10**  -.05  -.12**
Jobs to immigrants  -.11**  -.09**  -.12**  .00 
Business ownership  .06  -.02  -.15**  .01 
Left-right scale  -.11**  -.29**  -.33**  .06 
Explained variance, R2 .02** .06** .02** .15** .01** .23** .01* .03**
System distrust  .14 .15 .12   .23
Elite distrust  1.31  1.17 1.23   1.36
Taxes vs. Environment  .97 .86 .87   .99
Jobs to immigrants  .76 .96 .94   .93
Business ownership  2.15 2.05 2.20   2.15
Left-right scale  1.73 2.04 1.90   2.10
Dependent variable, sd.  .28 .34 .38   .29
N  1064 1182 1195   1107
* Significant at the 5%-level. 
** Significant at the 1%-level. 
For questions and coding see table 4.5. 
Source: World Values Survey 1990. 
 
First of all, the issues and belief-system variables have the opposite effects in table 
4.11 from my analyses of RRP-supporters (table 4.5). This is not surprising; it 
confirms the idea that the two groups of political parties are diametrical opposites. 
What is surprising is the apparent effect of political protest in table 4.11. There is 
hardly any system protest effect, but the elite variable is significant and positive in 
each case. Furthermore, the effect of elite distrust hardly changes when I control for 
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issue-variables32. That means that Left Libertarian voters express diffuse political 
protest, directed at the political elite. I found the same phenomenon among RRP-
supporters. 
 My analysis of Left Libertarian Parties supports the idea that elite protest is 
related to opposition voting. Despite the fact that Left Libertarian voters disagree with 
RRP-voters on most issues, they seem to express the same type of political protest, 
which they direct at the elite. This commonality can be explained by some other 
characteristics that these voters have in common, most notably their age. Left 
Libertarian and Radical Right Parties have, at least in parts of their histories, had 
significantly younger electorates than other parties33. Young people may be more 
skeptical of elites and authorities, which would account for a protest effect in my 
analyses. That appears not to be the case. I have performed a separate analysis, in 
which I controlled for age, and that did not change the effect of protest either for RRP-
support or support for Left Libertarian Parties34. Hence, I have found support for the 
hypothesis that elite protest is related to opposition voting. I will continue my 
exploration by looking at Social Democratic parties. 
 
Social Democratic Parties 
Social Democratic parties, or Labor parties as they are sometimes called, have been 
the major governing parties in the four countries in my study, in the post-WWII years. 
That is especially the case in Scandinavia, and more so in Sweden than in any other 
country. SPÖ in Austria has been in government more than any other party since 
World War II, although it has usually shared the position with ÖVP. In sum, these 
Social Democratic parties are symbols of position and power, unlike the Radical Right 
or Left Libertarian Parties. If my hypothesis that protest stems from opposition voting 
                                              
32 The effect actually increases in Norway and Sweden, which suggests that some of the issue-attitudes of these 
voters predispose them to hold trusting views of the elite. Hence, when issues are controlled for, the opposition-
motivated distrust becomes clearer.  
33 The Danish Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party deviates from that pattern in recent history; the 
elderly are now somewhat over-represented among their voters (Bjørklund and Goul Andersen 2001). 
34 I did multivariate analyses like those in tables 4.5 and 4.11, with age as an additional independent variable. It 
had a negative effect on support for both Radical Right and Left Libertarian parties. But this statistical control 
did not change the effect of the trust-variables in any substantial way. The standard regression coefficients of the 
elite distrust variable were as follows in the controlled analysis, for RRPs: Austria .10, Norway .14, and 
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is accurate, I should find the opposite effect at work with the Social Democratic 
Parties’ voters. I do not have a good word for it, but it would be a kind of “approval-
effect” toward the political elite. I expect the effects of the issue-variables to vary 
somewhat between countries, but they should primarily have negative effects, 
indicating a left-wing view. Table 4.12 shows the result of my analysis, with “support 
for a Social Democratic Party” as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 4.12 Impact of system- and elite distrust, as well as three issues and one 
ideology-scale, on support for the Social Democratic Parties of Austria, Norway, 
and Denmark, in 1990. Standardized regression coefficients 
 Austria 
(SPÖ) 
Norway 
(Labor) 
Denmark 
(Social Dems.) 
Sweden 
(Social Dems.) 
System distrust -.06 -.05 -.02 -.05 -.03 -.03 -.05 -.09**
Elite distrust -.07* -.04 -.08* -.08** -.06 -.08** -.19** -.10**
Taxes vs. Environment  -.05  .09**  .07*  -.04 
Jobs to immigrants  -.01  .07*  .14**  .07* 
Business ownership  -.19**  -.15**  -.05  -.13**
Left-right scale  -.09**  -.32**  -.28**  -.39**
Explained variance, R2 .01* .06** .01* .16** .00 .10** .04** .27**
Dependent variable, sd.  .50  .48  .47   .45 
* Significant at the 5%-level. 
** Significant at the 1%-level. 
For questions, coding, standard deviations of the independent variables, and N, see tables 4.5 and 4.11. 
Source: World Values Survey 1990. 
 
The effects of the elite trust variable generally confirms my expectation. There is a 
negative effect of distrust, or to avoid double negatives: a positive effect of trust. The 
effect is weakest in Austria, and it disappears when I control for the issues-variables. 
The effect appears to be strongest in Sweden, with Denmark and Norway somewhere 
in between35. This order of the approval effects corresponds fairly well with the degree 
of “dominance” that these parties have in their respective countries. It looks like the 
party that has been longest in government (the Swedish Social Democratic Party) 
elicits the strongest approval effect of their voters. Thus, I have found additional 
support for the idea that protest/approval relates to opposition/position voting. 
                                                                                                                                             
Denmark .12. For Left Libertarian Parties: Austria .11, Norway .12, Denmark .09, and Sweden .09. All effects 
were significant at the 1%-level. 
35 I am able to make this comparison because the standard deviations in this analysis are very similar. 
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There are some interesting effects of the issue-variables in table 4.12. Most are 
negative, which confirm that Social Democratic voters hold leftwing views; but there 
are also some positive effects, indicating rightwing views. The latter is evident in both 
Norway and Denmark on the question about taxes and environment, as well as on 
immigration. Swedish social democratic voters are also “rightwing” in their views of 
immigration. When it comes to the other distrust variable, i.e. system distrust, there is 
one interesting result in the table. It appears Social Democratic voters in Sweden are 
motivated by a positive attitude toward the political system (there is a negative effect 
of distrust). There is no such effect in the other countries. My findings in table 4.3 
indicated that the two levels of trust were more closely correlated in Sweden than in 
the other countries. That may account for the effect, although the correlation in itself is 
not a satisfactory explanation. The dominant position of the Social Democratic party in 
Sweden can provide a further explanation. The party may have been in government for 
so long that voters identify it as part of the political system itself. I am not in a position 
to make a final conclusion in this respect, beyond these initial suggestions. However, I 
do not believe that this Swedish abnormality has any bearing on my conclusion that 
there is an approval effect associated with support for the Social Democratic parties in 
these countries. I will now turn to Conservative parties to see what effects are at work 
among their voters. 
 
Conservative Parties 
Conservative Party voters probably share some of the attitudes and opinions of voters 
on the Radical Right, but I expect them to be different in terms of political protest. 
Conservative parties have been in government in all four countries at various times in 
their recent histories. The Austrian ÖVP, for instance, has taken part in several 
governing coalitions since the Second World War. The party has shared government 
control with SPÖ for most of the post-war years, and is identified as a “governing 
party”. Hence, I expect ÖVP voters to express approval of the political elite. 
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 The conservative parties in Scandinavia have a less dominant position, although 
they have all been in government at some point in their history. The Danish36 and 
Norwegian parties took part in several government formations in the 1980s. I expect 
that to be reflected in conservative voters’ attitudes toward the political elite in the 
1991 World Values Survey. The Swedish Conservative Party was in a different 
position in 1991. It had gone through a long period of opposition, through most of the 
1980s. Although they got into government in 1991, that was after the election, and 
after the WVS-data was collected. Hence, I do not expect Swedish conservative voters 
to express approval of the political elite in my analysis. Table 4.12 shows the result of 
an analysis of Conservative Party voters in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. 
  
Table 4.13 Impact of system- and elite distrust, as well as three issues and one 
ideology-scale, on support for Conservative parties in Austria, Norway, Denmark 
and Sweden, in 1990. Standardized regression coefficients 
 Austria 
(ÖVP) 
Norway 
(Conservatives) 
Denmark 
(Cons. / Liberals)
Sweden 
(Conservatives) 
System distrust .03 .02 -.07* -.04 .01 .02 -.03 .00 
Elite distrust -.09** -.11** -.06 -.06* -.10** -.09** .14** .03 
Taxes vs. Environment  -.02  -.04  .03  .08**
Jobs to immigrants  .00  -.08**  -.10**  -.01 
Business ownership  .14**  .13**  .15**  .11**
Left-right scale  .10**  .35**  .47**  .54**
Explained variance, R2 .01* .04** .01* .17** .01** .31** .02** .40**
Dependent variable, sd.  .47  .46  .45   .43 
* Significant at the 5%-level. 
** Significant at the 1%-level. 
For questions, coding, standard deviations of the independent variables, and N, see tables 4.5 and 4.11. 
Source: World Values Survey 1990. 
 
The evidence in the table confirms my main expectations. Conservative voters in 
Austria, Norway and Denmark express an approval of the political elite, like Labor 
party supporters. There is no such effect in Sweden; instead, conservatives in that 
country express disapproval of the elite37. Generally, conservative voters are 
supportive of the elite, when “their” party is or has recently been in government. If, 
                                              
36 I consider both the Liberal and the Conservative parties in Denmark to be conservative parties. Support for 
either of these parties will be the dependent variable in my statistical analysis in table 4.13. 
37 Conservative Party supporters in Sweden actually express what I have previously called “specific distrust”. 
The protest effect disappears when I include the issue variables, which means that the protest stems from those 
very issues. Hence, these voters distrust the elite because of policy-disagreements. 
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like in Sweden in 1991, a few years have passed since the last conservative 
government, these voters get increasingly hostile toward the elite. I consider this 
finding to be strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that political protest is related 
to governing positions.  
 I have now analyzed four different families of political parties in Austria, 
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. I believe I have found a general explanation for 
“protest voting” and “approval voting” that is valid irrespective of political parties. 
Radical Right Party voters are not unique because they express disapproval of the 
political elite. Rather, their attitudes confirm a general pattern that is directly related to 
voting for an opposition party. 
 
Conclusion 
I have looked at protest voting and political distrust from a number of angles in this 
chapter. I have found, first of all, that Radical Right Party voters are motivated by a 
“diffuse” protest against the political elite. That finding serves to confirm the 
arguments from parts of the literature on RRPs, which stress protest as an important 
motivation for RRP-supporters. However, this is in many ways a misleading 
observation, and it is highly insufficient as an explanation of RRP-support. 
 RRP-voters do not express distrust or opposition against the political system in 
any of the countries I have looked at. Their distrust is solely directed at the elite, i.e. 
politicians or people in government. RRP-supporters share a distrusting attitude with 
other opposition party voters. In fact, I have no reason to believe that political distrust 
is in any way unique to RRPs. The results of my analysis indicate that opposition party 
voters generally distrust the elite, while voters of parties in government express 
approval of the elite. 
Although I have established a relationship between position/opposition voting 
and trust/distrust, I have some doubts as to the causal relationship between these 
variables. I have assumed that political protest leads to support for one political party 
or another (see figures 1.1 or 1.2). That assumption may be accurate if people who 
distrust the elite generally choose opposition parties. However, it may be that 
supporting a party that is unable to access executive positions is so frustrating that you 
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end up distrusting the people in power. If so, the causal arrow should point in the 
opposite direction: from RRP support to the distrust variables (see figure 1.2). I will 
not explore this question further; suffice to say that both processes are probably at 
work. 
 Finally, I will point out an observation that easily gets lost in an extensive 
discussion of political protest, namely that distrust is not a very important motivation 
for opposition party voters. It is present among opposition party voters, but they are to 
a much greater extent motivated by substantial policies and beliefs. 
Now that I have answered my research questions and explored the relevant 
hypotheses, I will move on to discuss some of the consequences of my findings in the 
fifth and final chapter. I believe there are some lessons to be learned from my findings, 
and I will express some of my thoughts in that respect. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
Radical Right Party supporters in Austria, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden are no 
threat to the political systems of their countries. Their attitudes towards the political 
system do not deviate significantly from those of other voters. My analyses have 
confirmed and re-confirmed this finding throughout the previous chapter. I have not 
tried to reach any conclusions about the nature of the parties themselves; rather, I have 
focused on their voters. However, I believe this finding should ignite some skepticism 
about assertions to the effect that RRPs are a threat to the political systems of their 
countries. If RRP supporters do not express anti-system attitudes, the political parties 
they support may not be “anti system” either. 
Generally, I have found that the RRP-supporters’ attitudes of trust or distrust 
are consistent with their status as “opposition voters”. Like other voters who support 
parties that have not taken part in government formations for some time, they are 
skeptical or critical of the political elite. I also found that supporters of “governing 
parties”, i.e. parties that have recently taken part in government formations, were 
supportive of the political elite. Based on these findings, I find it reasonable to 
conclude that voters identify the “political elite” as the people in government. The fact 
that opposition voters do not trust the people in government does not seem like much 
of a sensational finding. That is why I will discuss some implications of my findings in 
this chapter, to find out if they are just a confirmation of what we already know, or if 
there are some lesions to be learned from my analysis. 
One of Robert Putnam’s (1976) advices to social scientists is a good starting 
point for this discussion. He argues: “the most important question to ask about any 
finding of social science is ‘so what?’” (p41). In other words: what does the finding 
mean in a larger context? Does it have any substantial implications for our 
understanding of politics and society? I will pose these questions to myself in the 
present chapter, as I look at my findings in a broader context than I have done thus far. 
As I pointed out in chapter one, RRP-supporters have been subject to criticisms 
and condemnations because of their distrust of the elite. I will now look at these 
criticisms and try to analyze their basis, in light of my findings. I will divide my 
discussion into two sections, the first of which deals with citizenship norms and 
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democratic ideals, and the extent to which RRP-supporters conform to such norms. In 
the second, and relatively brief section, I will suggest that critics of RRPs are 
politically biased against these parties. The critics’ bias may have led to some 
exaggerated denunciations of voters on the Radical Right. 
 
Democracy and Citizenship 
There has been an ongoing debate about the role of citizens in democracy, ever since 
the birth of political theory. I will not delve into all aspects of the debate, but rather 
focus on what I have found to be a predominant view among political scientists since 
the Second World War. The views I will outline here constitute an important basis for 
the critique of RRP-supporters. I will look at two examples of a much larger body of 
work that came about in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. This was a period when the 
future of democracy was an important subject for debate among political scientists. 
Several researchers of the time used the new tools of social research to test the 
democratic ideals against the workings of actual democracies (see e.g. Almond and 
Verba 1963; Converse 1964; Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975; Lane 1959). 
The scholars found reasons for optimism as well as pessimism on behalf of 
democracy, and some developed new theories that they adjusted to their findings. One 
famous such work is Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s “The Civic Culture” from 
1963. It has both normative and descriptive aspects that relate to the role of citizens. A 
second and more explicitly normative work that I will use is Crozier, Huntington and 
Watanuki’s “The Crisis of Democracy” (1975). Both works represent similar and 
generally accepted views on democracy and citizenship. I will proceed to offer a mild 
critique of these views, based on my findings in this dissertation. 
Almond and Verba describe the “Civic Culture” both as part of stable 
democracies and as a normative ideal for democratic countries. The “culture” has 
numerous facets, one of which relates to trust or “support” for political authorities. 
Almond and Verba argues that citizens who are able to participate in democracy will 
be “more satisfied with the decisions, and will be more attached to the system than 
those who cannot participate” (p191). This should be equally true for those who agree 
and for those who disagree with the government’s decisions. The British and 
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American populations hold democratic attitudes in this respect, since “participation in 
politics in these two nations is linked with both affective orientation to the political 
system and specific pragmatic expectations of the system” (p204). Still, Almond and 
Verba concede that their view of citizenship is somewhat inconsistent, because citizens 
are both subjects to, and the source of the government’s authority. To keep a balance 
between the two aspects, citizens must have an exaggerated belief in their own ability 
to influence decisions. When citizens believe strongly in their abilities in this respect, 
they will remain supportive of political authorities, which what secures democracy 
(p346). 
Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki use similar arguments about the role of 
citizens in their discussion of the “Crisis of Democracy” (1975). They have a 
pessimistic view of the future of democracy, in part because so many citizens fail to 
live up to the ideals outlined by Almond and Verba. The decline in political trust in the 
mid-1970s, led to a “delegitimation of authority”, in Crozier et al’s view. Whenever 
that happens, political leaders will be unable to exercise their power and the system 
fails to function like it should (pp. 162-163). They particularly emphasize the threat 
from parties of the Radical Left or Right who thrive on the trend toward 
delegitimation. Crozier et al argued that democratic and egalitarian attitudes were the 
reason for increased distrust and lack of support for authorities. Hence, they warn 
against an “excess of democracy” which would only add fuel to these flames. Their 
prescription is rather a “greater degree of moderation in democracy” (113). 
Crozier et al’s negative view of democracy seems particularly relevant for the 
attitudes of opposition voters I have found in my analysis. These voters do not trust the 
authorities, and they are not satisfied with their own lack of influence. Hence, they 
may represent, in Crozier et al’s words, an “intrinsic challenge to democracy”. I 
believe most of the criticism of RRP-supporters from political scientists and others is 
based on this view. The critics see distrust as a negative “defect” of democracy, which 
is present among RRP-supporters, in particular (Knight 1992; Morrow 2000; Nielsen 
1976; Riedlsperger 1998). I will argue in favor of a different, and more optimistic view 
of democracy and political distrust. 
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Political Distrust and Support for Democracy 
I have found that opposition party voters in Scandinavia and Austria protest against the 
political elite, but they are also supportive of the political systems in their countries. I 
believe the combination of those two attitudes is consistent with democratic principles, 
and it is in no way threatening our systems of government. The political systems of 
democratic countries function through an organized struggle for power, between 
“opposition” and “position” parties. I can see no reason why democracy is harmed by 
feelings of hostility between opposing political camps, as long as everyone accept the 
rules of the system. 
Furthermore, I do not believe distrust toward the elite leads to a “delegitimation 
of authority”, as Crozier et al suggested. In my analysis, I tried to distinguish the 
voters who support a political party that is or has recently been in government, from 
those who support parties that have been in opposition for some time. I found that 
these two groups of voters express markedly different levels of political trust. The first 
group expressed approval of the political elite, while the latter group consists of protest 
voters. Presumably, governments derive most of their legitimacy from the support of 
their own voters, and they are the same people who support political authorities. When 
governments change for a prolonged period of time, I observed a corresponding shift 
in who supports political authorities. I do not believe that the process of trust versus 
distrust and position versus opposition is threatening to political authorities. I see it as 
a natural continuation of the struggle for political power, which is part of every 
democracy. 
Finally, I will argue against what I will call the “diffuse rationalism” that is 
prevalent both in the theoretical writings I have referred to above, and in the general 
critique of RRP-supporters. This view is so well known and generally accepted, that 
writers often do not mention it directly. They argue that a well-functioning democracy 
depends on citizens who are rational, and who make informed decisions on Election 
Day. The ideal voter is a person who carefully weighs the policies and ideologies of 
one party against the others to make his or her decision. The “rational” view of 
citizenship in democracy corresponds to the “liberal” or “progressive” view of politics, 
which is predominant in most public debates of these types of issues (Schudson 1998). 
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I do not believe these views should be “blindly” accepted. For one thing, any “non-
rational” considerations by voters are alien to these views, and maybe even a threat to 
democracy. Political distrust is such a potential threat. 
The foremost exponents of a rational and substantive political debate are highly 
educated people, especially academics and political commentators. They are also the 
first to condemn any deviations from the rational ideal by voters or politicians. I do not 
believe that the political debate or politics in general should have to conform to the 
ideals of this elite-group. Since politics is important and concerns every citizen, it 
should play out in a way that allows everyone to participate. That means allowing for 
passion and emotion to play a part in the debate, as well as technocratic or rational 
arguments. Furthermore, passion has always been a part of politics; it is not new to 
political life. Academics, and especially political scientists can often be heard to 
defend party politics as the best way to organize democracy, but they seem to dislike 
the passion and emotion that has always been part of partisan politics. Political distrust 
and anti-establishment protest are a part of the same tradition (see e.g. McGerr 1986). 
As long as these attitudes do not threaten the democratic system, which I have found 
they do not, they should not be condemned. In fact, those who want greater 
engagement and participation in politics might do well to appeal to these and similar 
attitudes (Schudson 1994). 
To sum up: we should not worry too much about political distrust, as long as it 
is only directed at the political elite. I see distrust as a healthy sign, or an indication of 
a critical populace that does not blindly support political authorities. We should not 
expect opposition party voters to trust the people and parties in power; nor should we 
expect them to limit themselves to a strictly policy-oriented or ideological critique of 
the elite. Their emotionally charged and partisan expression of political distrust is also 
a part of democracy. 
 
Indecent Political Attitudes 
I want to add one more point to my discussion. I have found that all opposition party 
supporters express political protest, and I have now argued against the view that their 
attitudes are threatening to democracy. However, I have not explained why Radical 
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Right Party supporters have been the focus of most of this type of critique. In other 
words, why do some commentators and pundits criticize RRP-voters only, when all 
opposition party supporters express political distrust? 
I think the policies of Radical Right Parties and the views of their supporters 
can explain some of the criticism directed at them. In the public debate, the word 
“indecent” is often used in regard to RRPs. Commentators, pundits and others see 
some of the views of these parties as less than acceptable for public debate. This is 
especially the case in debates on immigration and racial issues, where RRPs are seen 
as at least borderline racist. I agree with some of the criticism of RRPs, but I do not 
believe their policies are directly related to political distrust. In fact, my analysis 
indicated that the political distrust of RRP-voters is unrelated to specific issues or 
attitudes; it is a “diffuse” political distrust. So, protest voting and possible indecent 
attitudes are separate issues and should be analyzed as such. The critics of these parties 
ought not to use political disagreements as an ulterior motive when they decry protest 
voting as a threat from the Radical Right. I have found that most opposition party 
voters are motivated by political protest. I see no reason why protest is especially 
threatening when it occurs on the Radical Right. 
 
Two Lessons 
I have discussed some of the implications of my findings in this chapter. I think my 
analysis served to refute some established perceptions about RRPs and their voters. 
Whenever you find reasons to change established perceptions, there are usually lessons 
to be learned for future research. The first lesson I draw from my discussion is that 
some oft-used and well-known citizenship norms should not be applied blindly to 
political science research. The ideal of the informed and always rational citizen is not 
entirely applicable to modern political life (if it ever was), yet democracy is not 
threatened by the failure of that ideal. Voters may be passionate, irrational, and less 
than well informed, without that having a negative effect on democracy. Shudson 
(1994) and others have written extensively on the subject, and I believe my findings 
support their argument in favor of a revised and updated ideal of democratic 
citizenship. 
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The second lesson I have learned is that political biases can occur in unexpected 
places. I have suggested that intellectuals and academics are no friends of Radical 
Right Parties, and that their attitudes have influenced political science research. Their 
dislike of RRPs may be justifiable, but they should not extend their bias to 
condemning protest voting on the Radical Right. That only serves to undermine their 
cause. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure A.1 Asylum rejections per 1000 inhabitants in Austria, 
Norway, Denmark*, and Sweden, from 1980 to 1999
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Sources: Asylum rejections: UNHCR Statistics: Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR - 1999 Statistical 
Overview. Populations: Statistik Austria, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Danmarks statistik, and Statistiska 
Centralbyrån. 
* There are no Danish data from 1988 to 1995. 
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 Table A.1 Six categories of vote explanation among FPÖ voters  
 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 
1: Protest 
against the 
elite 
Protest, 
dissatisfaction 
To weaken the 
large parties 
Commitment to 
clean politics 
and removal of 
privilege 
To give both 
main parties 
something to 
think about 
Exposure of 
corruption and 
scandals 
Privileges / 
nepotistic 
system 
Scandals / 
corruption in 
other parties 
Warning to the 
main parties 
Warning to the 
SPÖ 
Warning to the 
ÖVP 
FPÖ truly fights 
against scandals 
and privileges 
Against 
wastefulness 
Scandals, 
privilege, party 
accounts 
economy 
Uncovering 
political 
disgrace 
AK-scandal 
Warning, 
protest 
Disapproval of 
other parties, 
large parties in 
general 
Pike in the carp 
pond 
Scandals, 
privilege, 
Proporz 
political 
disgrace 
Dissatisfaction 
with 
government, 
other parties, 
protest 
Social fund 
misuse 
Disapproval of 
grand coalition
Against 
Haider’s 
ostracization 
Protest, 
dissatisfaction, 
warning 
Disapproval of 
other parties / 
politicians 
Scandals, 
uncovering 
disgraces, 
against Proporz
To give both 
coalition parties 
a warning 
2: Issues and 
belief 
systems 
Basic national 
tendency of 
FPÖ 
Basic liberal 
tendency of 
FPÖ 
Give 
nationalists 
voice again 
Immigrant 
policy 
Best program 
Conviction 
National 
awareness 
Abolition of 
compulsory 
membership 
Single issues 
FPÖ has the 
right policy on 
immigration 
Ideology 
Party program 
In agreement 
with opinions 
/good policy 
generally 
Immigration 
policy, anti-
immigrant 
Law and order 
Against the EU
Other policy 
themes 
 
 
Ideology 
Program, line, 
conviction 
Immigrant 
questions 
Taxes, saving, 
economy 
EU problem, 
rural economy 
Commitment on 
other themes, 
social groups 
 
Ideology, 
values, 
conviction 
Program, 
concept 
Immigration 
policy 
Family policy, 
children’s 
cheque [child 
maintenance] 
Rent / 
electricity rates
Other policies 
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 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 
3: Opposition 
support 
To strengthen 
the 
parliamentary 
opposition 
Hope to change 
things through 
the FPÖ 
To give the 
FPÖ a chance 
To bring a 
breath of fresh 
air into 
Parliament 
Give a chance 
Breath of fresh 
air 
Strengthen the 
opposition role
 
Opposition, 
control, power-
balance 
Critical of SPÖ
Critical of ÖVP
Breath of fresh 
air, wish for 
change 
Opposition, 
control 
Change through 
FPÖ 
Change of 
power, FPÖ in 
government 
 
Breath of fresh 
air / change 
FPÖ into 
government 
Good 
opposition party
 
4: Personal 
vote 
Jörg Haider  
Helmut Krünes 
generally 
Other FPÖ 
politicians 
 
Jörg Haider’s 
personality 
 
Haider 
Haider’s 
arguments 
Haider’s 
personality 
Haider 
Haider says 
what people 
think 
Truth, courage 
Haider 
Other 
FPÖ politicians
 
5: Likes the 
FPÖ 
Party 
membership 
Regular voter 
Represents my 
interests 
It’s a tradition 
to vote FPÖ for 
me 
Few / no 
scandals in the 
FPÖ 
Best party (7) 
Best politicians 
(young 
politicians) 
No compulsory 
membership 
Party 
membership 
Represents my 
interests 
Sympathy 
Oriented 
towards the 
future  
Control 
Regular voter / 
tradition 
Family tradition 
/ regular voter / 
member 
Represents 
interests 
Stands up for 
the little people, 
for Austria 
Modern party 
Honesty, 
openness 
Political style 
Reliable, 
trustworthy 
 
(Family) 
tradition, 
regular voter, 
member 
Represents 
interests 
FPÖ for work, 
little people 
Political style, 
friendly 
appearance 
Good, best, my 
party 
 
Family 
tradition, 
regular voter 
Interest 
representation 
Party for little 
people 
Good work / 
policies / 
commitment 
Different, 
honest party 
Good, better 
party 
Sympathy 
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 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 
6: Residual 
category 
Lack of other 
parties that 
could vote for 
Compared to 
the other 
parties, the FPÖ 
is the least of all 
evils 
Other reasons 
(Coalition-) 
proved party 
Private reasons
Only party that 
one can vote for
Other responses
Compared to 
other parties 
FPÖ is least of 
all evils 
Good, better, 
only party 
Other responses
Compared to 
other parties 
FPÖ is the least 
of all evils (7) 
Lesser evil 
Other reasons 
No response 
Tactical voting
Lesser evil 
Don’t know 
No response 
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